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Summary 
In the aftermath of the elections held in December of 2007, Kenya burst into flames. For 
nearly three months, the country was unsettled by a wave of ethno-political violence. This 
period of post-election violence saw more than a thousand Kenyans killed and between 
300,000 and 500,000 internally displaced. Among the areas most heavily hit was the capi-
tal city of Nairobi. Within Kenya’s political heart, the bulk of the violence took place in 
the slums. Life there was massively constrained by violent confrontations between follow-
ers of Raila Odinga – leader of the oppositional Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) – 
and the police forces associated with the incumbent regime of President Mwai Kibaki and 
his Party for National Unity (PNU). At the same time, members of Kibaki’s ethnic com-
munity, the Kikuyu, were selectively targeted by opposing groups. When fellow Kikuyu 
retaliated in the name of their peers, the flames of violence were fuelled even further. The 
PNU-ODM coalition government formed by President Kibaki and his challenger Odinga, 
in an attempt to end the violence at the end of February of 2008, has held until today. The 
next elections are scheduled for 2012,1 and they are already casting their foreboding 
shadow; as Kenya’s political elites are rather infamous for playing the ethnic card during 
election times. Based on this background and the fact that Kenya is up in arms over the 
summoning of six leaders to Den Haag for crimes against humanity, this report attempts 
to shed new light on the divisive characteristics and dynamics present during the fatal 
period of violence in Nairobi. By shifting our viewpoint to the perspective of Kenya's ur-
ban poor, the report generates empirical insights about the urban characteristics and dy-
namics that featured during the Kenyan post-election violence in Nairobi. Based on these 
insights, the message(s) inherent in the violence are then deciphered and extensive policy 
advice made. The latter includes political measures that should be the target of lobbying 
efforts in an effort to avoid another surge of violence prior to and following the 2012 elec-
tions, and, furthermore, detailed advice concerning the deployment and conduct of riot 
control units if violence should erupt again – including advice about which actions should 
be avoided by all means. 
The report is based on two theoretically derived assumptions: Firstly, the Kenyan post-
election violence was not a random phenomenon. It featured certain temporal, spatial as 
well as violent-specific characteristics that can be identified and explained. Secondly, just 
like other waves of ethnic violence, the Kenyan post-election violence is significant be-
yond the intentional infliction of pain on ethnic others. The totality of the violent acts 
committed not only reveals the broader picture but also hints at a more nuanced message 
 
 
1  President Mwai Kibaki’s second term and the legislative period of the current parliament will come to an 
end before or on December 31, 2012. Kenya’s new constitution, promulgated on August 27, 2010, pro-
vides that elections for these two as well as the newly established bodies of government (the Senate, coun-
ty assemblies and county governors) shall be held after the dissolution of the National Assembly at the 
end of its term, or given that the PNU-ODM coalition government that is currently in power is dissolved 
before 2012. While August of 2012 has been discussed as a potential month for conducting the first round 
of the presidential elections (and Kenya's High Court having thrown March of 2013 into the ring), the 
current state of affairs still suggests that comprehensive elections will be held in December of 2012 (see 
Shiundu 2011; Atwoli 2011; KLR 2010: Transitional and consequential provisions, part 3, § 9). 
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that can be decoded through structured analysis.  Given that every message preconditions 
a sender, this report presents its analysis of the Kenyan post-election violence from the 
perspective of Nairobi’s urban poor. Their perspective has been explored on the basis of 
first-hand data gathered by the author among a selected group of informants in the Nai-
robi slums of Kibera and Mathare. For the sake of applicability beyond the locally domi-
nant perceptions, these findings were subsequently triangulated with more general infor-
mation about the respective issues, derived from a wide array of available secondary data 
sources. The resulting account of post-election violence in Kenya's urban political heart 
comprises a wealth of insights with relevance for the micro and macro levels. With rhe-
torical reference to a locally famous photo exhibition titled ‘Kenya burning’, the chapter 
‘Kenya on fire’ presents the Kenyan political setting, introduces the main ethno-political 
alliances competing at the polls, gives a condensed historical account of the post-election 
violence, and discusses the pre-election atmosphere with emphasis on the role of the 
opinion polls and the disputed concept of Majimboism. Following this, Nairobi and its 
slums are introduced. The analytical section of the report has two parts; the first, titled 
‘Nairobi burning’, sheds empirical light on the divisive characteristics of violence in Nai-
robi in order to show how violence unfolded in the city. The second part, titled ‘Fuelling 
the flames’, investigates the dynamics of violence in Nairobi to enhance our understand-
ing of why the post-election violence unfolded as it did. 
‘Nairobi burning’ begins with a visualization of the temporal pattern of violence in the 
city. It retraces the changes in intensity of urban violence over a span of time, beginning 
with the pre-election period and then focuses on the violent post-election period. Subse-
quently, the content and function of rumours circulating in the slums is elaborated upon. 
The period of deadly quiet following Election Day on the 27th of December, 2007 is then 
investigated. Following an analysis of the characteristics of violence which subsequently 
erupted, the temporal pattern ends with an account of the sudden end to the violence on 
the 28th of February, 2008. The spatial analysis observes that violence was overwhelm-
ingly confined to Nairobi’s slums. Events in Mathare Valley and Kibera are put under 
close scrutiny, revealing and visualizing various individual and group related patterns of 
movement. Dominant among these patterns is the forceful creation of ethnically ho-
mogenous zones within the slums. The witnessed emergence of these zones, as it turns 
out, is closely related to the characteristics of violence in Nairobi. The analysis of the latter 
not only reveals various dominant types of violence against people and property, but also 
elaborates on the implications associated with these various sorts of violence, such as sexual 
mutilation or rent-related violence. What becomes clear is that in Nairobi, the primarily 
politically driven post-election violence quickly evolved into an all-consuming amalgam of 
ethnic, political, and instrumentally motivated acts of individual and group violence. 
‘Fuelling the fire’ sheds light on the simultaneity of group-level hostility and individual 
amity among slum-dwellers and explains how the former came to override the latter. It 
demonstrates why the opposition supporting slum-dwellers jointly focused on ‘the Ki-
kuyu’ as the initial target group, thereby ignoring other potential targets such as ‘the rich’ 
or ‘the regime.’ Subsequently, the various ways by which individuals were targeted in the 
midst of violence are elaborated on and risk aversion strategies presented. Following this, 
the dominant justifications for violence are presented. They show that political and mate-
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rial motives outweighed ethnic considerations; despite the fact that casualties among the 
latter dimension are, more or less, willingly accepted. An analysis of the social environ-
ment reveals that during the period of violence, the words and actions of Kenya’s top 
politicians massively gained in importance for the slum-dwellers – regardless of the ends 
or uses of these authoritative powers. Lastly, the perceived composition of perpetrator 
groups is investigated, and the highly ambivalent role of neighbourhood watch groups, 
youth groups, and ‘shadowy’ gangs explored. 
A structured analysis of the dynamics that fuelled the fires of violence in Nairobi re-
veals not one but two messages inscribed in the violence. The first refers to the initial 
character of anti-Kikuyu violence. This should be understood in the context of the vio-
lently enforced isolation of the slums, whose marginalized inhabitants were literally 
barred from reaching the main stage of politics in Nairobi's city centre. By victimizing 
their ethnically different neighbours, the opposition supporting slum-dwellers sent a 
bloody message to Kenya's perceived Kikuyu-dominated elite. They aimed to teach the 
opposition a lesson by punishing its people for betraying Odinga and for the decades of 
dishonour and degradation that they felt they had endured. This message was, however, 
not the only one: By identifying traces of commonalities among the slum-dwellers and 
lasting bonds of individual friendship beyond inter-group boundaries, a second message 
inscribed in the violence is also revealed. It emanated from the slums towards Kenya’s 
wider society and resembled a joint outcry for democratic inclusion and socio-economic 
improvement, taking violent forms since other channels for making their voices heard 
were barred. This has to be understood in the context of the weak performance of politics 
in Kenya, suggesting that its political leaders do not necessarily perceive themselves as 
having a stake in their multi-ethnic nation's joint future. 
Given that potentials for peaceful inter-ethnic cooperation do still exist for the mar-
ginalized have-nots, this report concludes that the maintenance of peace in Kenya ulti-
mately requires that those political leaders who intend to run in 2012 act beyond the nar-
row margins of political tribalism. In view of the importance that the urban poor assign to 
symbolic gestures from their top politicians, a truly inter-ethnic alliance needs to be 
formed publicly in the run-up to the 2012 elections. This alliance must include the main 
antagonized groups, i.e. the Kikuyu and the Luo, while at the same time abstaining from 
alienating their poor and marginalized ethnic peers in the slums, as well as those Kenyans 
who associate themselves with (formerly) allied ethnic communities such as the Kalenjin. 
To lobby in favour of the creation of such a top-level inter-ethnic political alliance should 
be the priority of domestic as well as international actors. Kenya’s political elites have 
already proven that they are able to unite under a common banner and act in the interest 
of their ethnically diverse country, not least during the joint and peaceful ousting of long-
term dictator President Daniel Arap Moi in 2002 and the peaceful implementation of a 
constitutional referendum held in 2010. In this spirit, Kenya’s civil society, along with the 
international community, should continue to remind the country’s politicians that their 
primary tasks should be to prepare the groundwork for mid-term political inclusion 
and socio-economic improvement of their ethnically diverse electorates. Kenya is 
among the few African countries whose legal system does not allow for the banning of 
political parties with particularistic agendas. This should be changed by introducing regu-
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lations and policies that aim at de facto limitation on the influence of political parties that 
primarily function as vehicles to power for leaders who appeal exclusively to members of 
specific ethnic communities while alienating others. 
In regards to the micro level, the report draws several conclusions about how urban 
crowd control should be conducted during the next elections – and which measures must 
be avoided by all means possible, such as repressive police tactics that include the violent 
cordoning off of the slums from the rest of Nairobi and the excessive use of lethal force. 
The negative effects of such tactics cannot be overstated. If the use of repressive force to 
quell large-scale acts of riot violence is necessary nonetheless, research on past riots tells 
us that the army should be rapidly deployed, as indiscriminate shows of force during the 
early stages of violence seem to deter rioters. This fact does not, however, imply that vio-
lent force should be freely unleashed – far from it! As the memorable example of one re-
sponsible paramilitary anti-riot leader reminds us, appeasing rioting mobs through well-
meant words is certainly a viable strategy – especially if backed with a credible threat of 
force. Any excessive use of regime-directed violence against the masses of primarily po-
litical demonstrators would be highly counter-productive, and would only fuel the spiral 
of violence. This explicitly applies to the (rather likely) event that political protests by 
Kenya’s poor will be accompanied by instrumental acts of violence such as looting or 
arson. Beyond that, utmost care needs to be taken in order to ensure that Kenya’s impov-
erished urban (and rural) areas are continuously supplied with necessary provisions (such 
as mobile phone credits) and, most importantly, affordable groceries and foodstuffs. In 
Nairobi, this means that safe supply corridors must be kept open at all times, allowing the 
urban poor to provide for themselves and their families. 
Well-meaning members of the international community also have a role to play in 
preparing the groundwork for Kenya's next elections, not least by lobbing in favour of 
political alliance-building at the macro level and demonstrating restraint and responsive 
behaviour at the micro level. In the end – regardless of the fate of the (in)famous ‘Ocambo 
six’ at Den Haag – Kenya’s fate is in the hands of its political elites. Its future – in unity or 
conflict – depends on the very words and actions they promote publicly and on how these 
are perceived by their impoverished electorates in their ethnically diverse urban and rural 
electoral districts. As an anonymous informant put it in reference to his fellow slum-
dwellers; “when they join their hearts, you cannot stop them”. 
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1.  Introduction 
For decades, Kenya had been considered one of East Africa's few bastions of peace. Despi-
te serious societal tensions and sporadic flare-ups of violence, the ethnically fragmented 
country had managed to avoid large-scale bloodshed. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the 
elections held in December of 2007, Kenya burst into flames. For two months, the country 
was unsettled by a wave of heavy ethno-political violence, claiming more than one thou-
sand lives and forcing between 300,000 and 500,000 Kenyans to flee their homes, most of 
them being internally displaced  in rural areas such as the Rift Valley Province. Kenya’s 
capital city of Nairobi was among the urban areas which were most heavily hit by the so-
called ‘post-election violence’2. In Nairobi, the bulk of the violence took place in the city's 
vast impoverished areas. Violent confrontations broke out between supporters of Raila 
Odinga, the leader of the oppositional Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), and the 
police forces associated with the incumbent regime of President Mwai Kibaki and his 
Party for National Unity (PNU) in the slums and along their boundaries. At the same 
time, members of the President’s ethnic community, the Kikuyu, were selectively targeted. 
When fellow Kikuyu members retaliated for the sake of their group (e.g. by carrying out 
acts of violence against members of Odinga’s ethnic community, the Luo, or when they 
perceived retaliation to be imminent) the flames of inter-ethnic violence in the city were 
fuelled even further. Inter-ethnic peace was finally restored at the end of February 2008, 
following massive diplomatic intervention and international mediation efforts under the 
supervision of African Elder Kofi Annan. Ever since, a grand coalition government lead 
by President Mwai Kibaki (PNU) and Prime Minister Raila Odinga (ODM) has been pul-
ling the country’s political strings. Much like Kenya’s fragile peace, it has managed to 
remain intact to this day despite serious political face-offs and a general lack of effective 
societal and legal efforts of coming to terms with the past. 
1.2 Research interest 
With the 2012 elections looming ominously on the horizon, and with Kenya’s political class 
once again up in arms over the summoning of six leaders to Den Haag for crimes against 
humanity3, this report attempts to shed renewed light on the divisive characteristics and 
dynamics that featured during the fatal period of post-election violence. It does so based on 
two theoretically substantiated assumptions: Firstly, violence in Kenya in general and in 
Nairobi in particular was not a random phenomenon. It featured certain identifiable tem-
poral, spatial as well as violent-specific characteristics. The same applies to the divisive dy-
namics that produced these characteristics in the first place, which can also be identified 
 
 
2  In line with the common usage of the term in Kenya and in accordance with the definition of the Com-
mission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence (Waki 2008), the period referred to in this report as ‘post-
election violence’ begins on the 27th of December, 2007 (Election Day), covering the outbreak of vi-
olence on December 30/31, and ending on the 28th of February, 2008 when peace was finally restored. 
3  In December 2010, the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo released 
the names of six prominent Kenyans, who were summoned to Den Hague in March of 2011 on charges 
of massive crimes committed during the post-election violence in Kenya (see ICC 2010). 
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and explained. This is carried out for the sake of generating conclusions about measures 
that should be taken in order to avoid repeated violence in 2012 – and, likewise, which acti-
ons must be avoided by all means possible. Secondly, just like other waves of ethnic riot 
violence, the Kenyan post-election violence carries significance beyond intentional inflic-
tion of pain on ethnic others. Those who engaged in violent confrontations with police for-
ces and those who launched bloody attacks on their ethnically different neighbours in Nai-
robi’s slums might have acted spontaneously. However, the totality of the violent acts 
committed reveals a larger picture. Substantiated knowledge on ethnic riots tells us that this 
broader picture of the post-election violence carries a message that can be decoded through 
structured analysis. With the aim of learning from the past by listening to those who enga-
ged in acts of violence and those who endured the bulk of its gruesome consequences, this 
report supports the aforementioned idea. By retracing and explaining the divisive dynamics 
of violence in Nairobi, the report seeks to identify and decipher the message(s) conveyed 
through violence in Kenya’s urban heart of politics. 
1.3 Nairobi’s slum-dwellers 
Given that every message predicates the existence of a sender, this report does not aim to 
offer an objective analysis from the perspective of an outside observer. Instead, the cha-
racteristics and dynamics of violence are retraced from the shared perspective of Nairobi’s 
slum-dwellers. This decision was deliberate: Nairobi is Kenya’s political heart and eco-
nomic powerhouse; it is the undisputed urban stage upon which Kenya’s socio-economic 
and political elites carry out their disputes. In Nairobi, political intrigues are woven, and 
power struggles won and lost. Nairobi is an urban conglomeration of about 6 million 
inhabitants with an infrastructure dating back to the early 1970s, made to shelter about 
300,000. Like most post-colonial African cities, Nairobi is currently highly segregated 
with about half of its total population living in the slums, which account for only about 
10% of the city’s territory. During the post-election violence, the bulk of the hostilities 
took place in the slums. Nairobi’s marginalized poor were also most affected by violence, 
as they accounted for the masses of enraged Kenyans who (allegedly) engaged in political, 
ethnic, and instrumental (i.e. economically motivated) acts of violence. The fatal interplay 
of their actions, supported by hundreds of thousands of bystanders, who associated them-
selves with the deeds of their ethnic peers, became a decisive weight in the ongoing politi-
cal power struggle.  
In order to elaborate on the slum-dwellers’ shared perspective, presented throughout 
this report, the author has conducted extensive field research in the slums of Nairobi, pri-
marily among selected groups of mostly young male slum-dwellers in Kibera and Mathare, 
Nairobi’s largest and most (in-)famous slums.4 In an attempt to go beyond the locally 
 
 
4  The groups were politically and ethnically diverse and comprised of between seven and twenty mem-
bers. The selected groups did not know each other. Most informants associated themselves with the 
main ethno-political alliances introduced below. In order to gain insights into their life-worlds and 
elaborate on their narratives of the past period of violence, along with its material and immaterial local 
legacies, I stayed with them for several months in 2009. 
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dominant perceptions by the interviewees and to provide for a sound empirical basis, a vast 
array of additional data sources have subsequently been incorporated into the analysis. All 
of this data broaches issues that relate in one way or another to the unfolding of Kenya’s 
post-election violence in Nairobi. The secondary data sources include many sorts of avail-
able publications and reports and, not least, the full scope of newspaper coverage of the 
period of violence as archived by Kenya’s two main papers The Standard and The Nation.5 
1.4 Conceptual remarks 
This report seeks to identify the messages conveyed through violence in Nairobi. It does so 
following Donald L. Horowitz’s (2001: 2) notion that “like the willingness to die for a cause, 
the willingness to kill for a cause constitutes a kind of statement about the cause, the killer, 
the victim, and the act of killing.” According to Horowitz, this ‘kind of statement’, the riot 
message, is inscribed in the patterns of violence and is mirrored in its often devastating con-
sequences. Drawing from the impressive amount of knowledge that Horowitz presents in 
his central works on ethnic riot violence (in particular Horowitz 2001; see also 2000), the 
report assumes that the riot message can be decoded analytically by, first, identifying the 
central characteristics of riot violence, and, second, by retracing the divisive dynamics that 
contributed to the specific means of riot violence. The three central characteristics singled 
out for analysis cover temporal as well as spatial patterns of violence and the characteristics 
of violence.6 Beyond that, the analysis utilizes five analytical elements, crucial in deciphering 
the divisive dynamics of violence. These elements are: inter-ethnic polarization; inter-ethnic 
hostility and targeting; justifications for violence; the supportive social environment; and 
the role of participants, perpetrators and bystanders in acts of violence.7 
 
 
 Access to the groups was gained using snowballing techniques. These were of course constrained by the 
practical challenges that go along with any research project conducted in (urban) areas of limited state-
hood. The selection process took into account the fact that urban male youths are a high-risk group 
most prone to engage in criminal acts and/or violent unrest (UN-Habitat 2007: 70f; Small Arms Survey 
2007: 161), and in awareness of the fact that available reports and publications indicate that young males 
had been the main group of participants in acts of post-election violence throughout Kenya. 
 To give the reader some insight into this study’s empirical data, the informants’ pseudonyms (followed 
by their slums and the position of the relevant information in the transcripts) are referenced throughout 
the analysis. Readers interested in accessing the material are asked to directly contact the author. 
5  Both are nation-wide published daily papers with the first one being said to be siding slightly more with 
the opposition and the later being somehow pro-government (compare for example KNCHR 2006a).  
6  For the temporal pattern of violence see Horowitz (2001: 71ff, 75, 89, 269, 271, 317, 318, 373, 411, 524), 
concerning the spatial pattern of violence see Horowitz (2001: 382ff, 390, 394, 397, 401, 403ff, 407). Re-
garding the characteristics of violence see Horowitz (2001: xiii, 1, also 53ff). 
7  Concerning inter-ethnic polarization see Horowitz (2001: 150, 385, 525-529, 543), more specifically for 
occasions where violence is triggered by divisive elections see Horowitz (2001: 296, 299ff, 305). Regard-
ing inter-ethnic hostility and individual targeting see Horowitz (2001: 124, 129ff, 150, 194, 197, 423, 
525). For justifications of ethnic violence see Horowitz (2001: 367ff, 371, 525). For the supportive social 
environment see Horowitz (2001: 344, 347, 348, 352, 355, 357-364). Concerning participants, perpetra-
tors and by-standers see Horowitz (2001: 73, 527, 535, 543). 
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1.5 Procedure 
Throughout this report the metaphor ‘Nairobi burning’ is utilized. It serves to structure 
the introductory chapter, as well as the analytical ones and the conclusions. The metaphor 
refers to a collection of over one hundred powerful photographic images captured during 
the pre- and post-election period in Kenya, which were publicly displayed under the title 
‘Kenya burning’ by the GoDown Arts Centre in Nairobi, just a couple of months after the 
flames of inter-ethnic violence had gone out countrywide.8 This introduction is followed 
by a descriptive chapter titled ‘Kenya on fire’ (chap. 2). It provides the reader with a brief 
introduction to Kenya’s political setting, the main ethno-political actors competing at the 
polls, and a countrywide account of how Kenya erupted into flames following the 31st 
December, 2007. On account of their importance for the analysis to follow, the principal 
campaign issues along with the heavily disputed concept of Majimboism are thereafter 
presented and discussed. Last but not least, an introduction to Nairobi and its slums is 
given. The ensuing analysis of the post-election violence from the slum-dwellers’ joint 
perspective is divided into two parts. The first part – titled ‘Nairobi burning’ (chap. 3) – 
sheds empirical light on the divisive characteristics of post-election violence in Nairobi, 
with the goal of ascertaining how violence unfolded in the city. This is done, firstly, by 
reconstructing the temporal patterns of violence in Nairobi (chap.3.1), secondly, by re-
tracing the spatial patterns of violence in the slums and along their boundaries (chap.3.2), 
and, thirdly, by identifying the dominant sorts of violence the slum-dwellers were con-
fronted with during the post-election violence (chap.3.3). 
The second part of the analysis is titled ‘Fuelling the flames’ (chap. 4). It first assesses 
five analytical elements, putting them under empirical scrutiny in order to enhance our 
understanding of why the wave of ethno-political violence in Nairobi unfolded as it did, 
commencing with an exploration of the character of inter-ethnic polarization among the 
slum-dwellers (chap 4.1). Second, the focus of group hatred specifically on the Kikuyu as 
well as on the processes that accompanied individual targeting and/or victimization is 
assessed (chap. 4.2). Third, the dominant justifications for violence are explored (chap. 
4.3), and, fourth, the supportive role of certain parts of the social environment are dis-
cussed (chap.4.4). Lastly, light is shed on the perceived compositions and ambivalent roles 
of the main groups of perpetrators, supporters and bystanders related to acts of violence 
(chap.4.5). 
The study ends with the identification of two messages conveyed through the violence 
(chap. 5). Supported by an analysis of the characteristics and dynamics of violence in 
Kenya’s urban heart of politics (chap. 5.1), these messages provide for a basis upon which 
substantiated policy advice aimed at preventing future flare-ups of violence is developed 
(chap. 5.2).  
 
 
8  Later on, the exhibition was shown in other parts of Kenya and the images were compiled in a popular 
publication with the same title. See further: www.thegodownartscentre.com/kenya-burning/ 
(12.10.2011). 
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2.  Kenya on fire 
Kenya is a severely divided society, characterised by enormous gaps between rich and 
poor, rural and urban. All layers of Kenyan society have been skewed along ethnic lines 
for decades. Empowerment and redistribution policies are largely absent and corruption 
runs rampant.9 Since Kenya’s independence in 1964, political tribalism has almost always 
triumphed over moral ethnicity (Klopp 2002; Orvis 2001; Omolo 2002). Nevertheless, it 
has only been since the opening of the regime to multi-party politics in the early 1990s 
that violent inter-ethnic clashes have periodically dominated the country's political agen-
da (Ajulu 2002 and 2003; EU EOM 2003 and 2008). Spurred by democratic competition, 
Kenya’s elites have increasingly played the ethnic card in their zero-sum games for perso-
nal wealth and power – the (bloody) consequences of which reach a crescendo around 
election dates.10 Apart from election times however, inter-ethnic clashes among Kenyans 
have been limited to remote rural areas (KNCHR 2006b; KEC-CJPC 2007: 58-60). 
As in previous elections, the main parties competing in the 2007 elections were tribal 
alliances with nominated key politicians personally representing their ethnic group.11 The 
underlying congruency of ethnic identity and political party in Kenya was once again 
confirmed on Election Day when the electorates voted almost entirely along ethnic lines 
(Mutua 2008: 237ff; Gibson/Long 2008; Taibl 2009). The main ethnic groups, their 
political parties and its leaders vying for power at the polls in December of 2007 were:12 
• The Kikuyu, Embu and Meru. They were politically represented by the Party for Na-
tional Unity (PNU) and led by President Mwai Kibaki, an ethnic Kikuyu. 
• The Luo, Luhya, and Kalenjin and several other communities (among these many Kisii 
and Maasai). They were politically represented by the Orange Democratic Movement 
(ODM) and led by the presidential aspirant Raila Odinga, an ethnic Luo. 
 
 
9  Kenya is ranked 154th out of 178 states in Transparency International’s (2010) recent corruption per-
ceptions index. About 50% of all Kenyans live below the poverty line; the country's Gini coefficient was 
estimated to be 42.5 in 2008. Regarding the degree of inequality in the distribution of family income, 
Kenya is ranked 53rd in the world. With a population of about 37 million, the people of Kenya are di-
vided into approximately 42 ethnic groups spread over a territory of 580,000 km2. 
 The most populous ethnic groups are the Kikuyu (between 22% and 30%), the Luo (13%), the Luhya (14%), 
the Kalenjin (12%), the Kamba (11%), the Kisii (6%), and the Meru (6%). Note that all figures are estimates 
and vary considerably depending on literature, here derived from CIA (2011) and Sellier (2008: 172). 
10  See Mutua (2008); KNCHR (2006a; 2007; 2008a); HRW (2008); Wong (2009); FES (2001). 
11  For a well-written account of the post-election violence which provides for background information on 
(ethnicised) politics of regionalism in Kenya, see Lafargue & Katumanga (2008). 
12  The remaining main ethnic group, the Kamba, was represented by the political party ODM-K, led by the 
tribal baron Kalonzo Musyoka. Musyoka won a paramount electoral victory in Eastern Province (consi-
dered to be the home of the Kamba people) but could not gain any serious support elsewhere in the 
country. After the president was announced, Musyoka left the opposition and became Vice-President in 
Kibaki's newly forged government. 
6 Andreas Jacobs 
 
 
2.1 A brief historical account 
On the 27th December, 2007, Kenyans went to the polls in an overwhelmingly peaceful 
manner. Unfortunately, peace was not to prevail. Largely in response to the poor public 
performance of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) – the government-dependent 
institution responsible for conducting elections and the handling and tallying of votes – 
mass rallies began countrywide on December 29. These were called forth by the oppositio-
nal Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). In Nairobi, the pronounced aim of many de-
monstrations was to storm the Kenya International Conference Centre (KICC) in downt-
own Nairobi, where the chaotic, initially live-broadcasted vote tallying had taken place. 
Large-scale violence erupted on December 30 and 31 following the hastily organised, secre-
tive inauguration of incumbent President Mwai Kibaki from the Party for National Unity 
(PNU). Notably, Kibaki virtually disappeared from the public radar during the first week of 
violence. The eruption of violence was triggered by an culmination of factors, not least 
among them the constantly changing tally figures being reported, highly dubious official 
results, and repressive measures such as a government-decreed ban of live media reports 
and a reinforcement of state security forces. Together with local factors, they entrenched the 
opposition’s perception that the PNU regime had rigged the elections.13 
Violence against symbols of the PNU regime and members of the PNU-aligned ethnic 
communities was clearly initiated by members of the oppositional ethnic communities, 
politically assembled under the banner of ODM. Ethnic reprisal attacks quickly followed 
as ethnic militias, mobs and gangs spearheaded the evolving inter-group clashes through-
out the country. While the Kalenjin- (and Kikuyu-) dominated Rift Valley Province was, 
by all accounts, hardest hit, inter-ethnic attacks as well as political acts of violence during 
mass rallies erupted all over the country. As indicated above, life in Kenya's impoverished 
urban melting-pots was massively constrained by violent confrontations between demon-
strators and police forces as well as by an unfolding spiral of gruesome acts of inter-ethnic 
violence. With all major roads, such as the Uganda railway – linking Mombasa to the 
interiors of Uganda and passing through Nairobi’s slum of Kibera – under siege, trans-
port in Kenya was violently interrupted. In response, police and military convoys were set 
up during periods of heavy hostilities in order to safeguard the basic functioning of 
Kenya’s transport networks. 
During the two months of post-election violence in Kenya, about 1,500 people lost 
their lives and between 300,000 and 500,000 internally displaced persons were counted, 
the majority in Eastern Kenya, especially in violence-ridden Rift Valley. In Nairobi, 124 
 
 
13  Nation (4.12.2007: 1): “Kivuitu to ODM team: Poll won't be rigged” by Nzioka, Patrick. Nation 
(15.12.2007: 5): “Poll fraud 'biggest challenge' for ECK” by Kopecky, Arno. Nation (25.12.2007: 6): “Pro-
prietor denies claims” by Ombati, Cyrus; Obare, Osinde. Nation (26.12.2007: 2): “Polling clerks in pro-
test over pay” by Nation Team. Nation (27.12.2007: 4): “ECK alert over election fraud, says Kivuitu” by 
Nation Reporter. Nation (2.12.2007: 10): “Shameless ode to the Narc revolution” by Mathiu, Mutuma. 
Nation (2.12.2007: 24): “Grey area in transition law” by Siringi, Samuel. Nation (24.12.2007: 17): “Past 
elections since independence and how they shaped the country's politics” by Gaitho, Macharia. Standard 
(9.12.2007: 6): “Is Kenya ready for a transition?” no Author. “ECK all set for elections as stations open 
today at 6am” by Orlale, Odhiambo; see also Harneit-Sievers (2008). 
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deaths were counted with 23 deaths resulting from gun shots (61 wounded), 29 deaths 
from clearly identified sharp pointed objects, 9 caused by blunt objects and the remaining 
deaths being classified as mob-injustice (21) and unknown (42). The overall number of 
injuries inflicted during the post-election violence is likewise unknown (Waki 2008). Over 
72,000 people were displaced in the city’s informal settlements, with the real number as-
sumed to be much higher, keeping in mind that many slum-dwellers “shifted to more 
friendly neighbourhoods in other parts of the city and in some cases, to rural areas” 
(KNCHR 2008a: 40). The killings were also marked by brutality: reports about intense 
emotions, horrifying atrocities and mutilations were great in number. The types of vio-
lence prominent in the slums included the destruction of property through arson, the 
expulsion of ethnic out-group members by gangs of youths (often followed by a takeover 
of the refugee's house), sexual abuse and/or brutal mutilation by police forces, groups of 
youths and/or sect/gang-like movements such as the Mungiki or the Taliban (HRW 2008: 
44; compare below chap. 4.5). Up to this day, no public institution has been held liable for 
what happened during the post-election violence.14 The impacts of post-election violence 
dramatically altered, by means of forceful homogenisation, the ethnic make-up of many 
parts of Kenya (Wong 2009; Gibson & Long 2008: 501; KNCHR 2008b: 7; HRW 2008: 
28). Both the large areas of the Rift Valley Province and certain unspecified areas in Nai-
robi's slums of Mathare and Kibera are said to “have been carved into enclaves where 
vigilantes from one ethnic group or another patrol 'their' areas” (HRW 2008: 56). No data 
exist that can provide for a reliable assessment of the actual ethnic composition of the 
slums – neither before nor after the post-election violence. 
The post-election violence finally came to an end when the country’s top politicians, 
Odinga and Kibaki, agreed to a peace accord under the supervision of former UN Secre-
tary-General Kofi Annan, chairperson of the so-called ‘Panel of Eminent African Person-
alities’. Earlier attempts to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, conducted by AU 
mediator President John Kufuor of Ghana about a week-and-a-half into the violence, had 
failed. The Kenyan Peace Accord resulted in the creation of the position of a Prime Minis-
ter (subsequently held by Odinga), the institutionalisation of a grand coalition govern-
ment (which is, with about 41 ministers and 50 assistant-ministers, admittedly quite 
bloated), and the agreement to revive the process of institutional change in Kenya.15 The 
Peace Accord was publically announced on February 29, 2008. The same day, violence 
came to an almost immediate end throughout the country. 
2.2 The pre-election atmosphere 
Two specific issues are vital for understanding the internalisation of exclusive political 
stances among various members of the opposing ethnic groups, especially among the 
 
 
14  Waki (2008); KNCHR (2008a); HRW (2008); Wong (2009); Alston (2009); KPTJ (2008); Kriegler (2008). 
15  The latter links back to a central demand of the Orange Democratic Movement, which was created 
during the political fallout that accompanied the Kenyan constitutional referendum held in 2005 (the 
Orange symbolized ‘No’ on the ballot sheets). For a descriptive account and analysis of the pre-election 
campaigns see Cussac (2008). 
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impoverished ones. The first refers to the character of the central campaign issues and the 
second to the role of the public opinion polls, which were practically omnipresent in the 
pre-election period. Together, they promoted the dominant attitude that one's own politi-
cal party/ethnic group could by no means risk an electoral defeat.16 During the pre-
election period, Odinga and Kibaki campaigned hard to make their voices heard, inter-
mingling issues with emotions and ethnicity. In doing so, the politicians made it abun-
dantly clear that they would not accept any alternative outcome to the elections but their 
own electoral victory. Ethnic undertones were wide-spread in the streets of the slums, 
where heated debates between supporters of the two top candidates contributed to an 
ethnic polarisation of support. 
Majimboism provides a brilliant example of an ethnically-loaded campaign issue: Od-
inga charged Kibaki with helping the rich and ignoring Kenya's poor, and promised to 
decentralise the country through constitutional revision inspired by majimboism. Majim-
boism is a Swahili/East African concept of local rule, often understood as political decen-
tralisation, devolution, federalism or local and/or regional self-government. Compared 
with Kenya's highly centralised constitutional design, majimboism is, on the surface, a 
political matter that requires political arguments to campaign for. However, when con-
trasted with Kenyan demographics (the concentration of some ethnic groups in certain 
regions and the presence of others, mainly the Kikuyu but also the Luo, throughout the 
country), majimboism has an intrinsically ethnic dimension, and opportunities for ethnic 
bias are high. Among the slum-dwellers interviewed, it was, for example, considered 
common knowledge that central Kenya is the home of the Kikuyu; it is Kibaki's strong-
hold, and subsequently a PNU area. Nyanza Province, on the other hand, is the home of 
the Luo, Raila's stronghold, and an ODM area.17 
The widely-publicised daily opinion polls, which predicted a neck-and-neck race, in-
flamed the boiling emotions in the slums further. They solidified the ODM supporters’ 
perception that their leader Odinga was destined to win the presidential elections long 
before the actual votes were cast. The year 2007 was the first in Kenya's electoral history 
during which opinion polls were conducted, and they were widely featured by all major 
 
 
16  Nation (19.12.2007): “Three cars burnt in poll chase” by Nthiga, Silas; Amadala, Benton. Nation 
(24.12.2007: 8); “Youths rough up Ngugi's wife” by Mathenge, Oliver; Mburu, Stephen. Standard 
(15.12.2007: 4): “Bishop Wanjiru attacked during campaign” by Ratemo, James. Nation (1.12.2007): 
“Riot in Molo over arrest of youths” by Siele, Simon; Mureithi, Francis. Nation (2.12.2007): “Tension as 
police disperse youth after Kibaki's rally” by Sunday Nation Correspondent. Nation (13.12.2007: 9): 
“Booing and heckling mar fete” by Ringa, Mathias. Standard (24.12.207): “25 die in campaign violence” 
by Ombati, Cyrus. Nation (24.12.2007: 5): “ECK to quiz Shitanda over election violence” by Nation 
Team. Standard (18.12.2007: 6): “Violence against PNU and ODM leaders” by Ndegwa, Alex. Nation 
(24.12.2007: 2): “Youth stone cars on highway in bid to block ODM rally” by Nation Correspondents. Na-
tion (25.12.2007): “Stone democracy” by Okendo, Boniface. Nation (25.12.2007): “ODM's day of splen-
dour” by Ndegwa, Alex &. “Pomp, colour at PNU's last rally” by Wachira, Patrick. See also Ajulu (2003: 
13f); Mutua (2008: 228); KNCHR (2006a: 10, 16f); KNCHR (2007); Lynch (2006: 233); Wong (2009: 297); 
EU EOM (2008); KPTJ (2008: 11). 
17  Note that other provinces like Eastern (Kamba, ODM-K, Musyoka), Western (Luhya, ODM, Odinga), 
or the heavily contested Rift Valley (Kalenjin, ODM, Ruto/Kikuyu, PNU, Kibaki) have not been specifi-
cally mentioned by the informants. 
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media channels and newspapers. Minor variations aside, the figures provided by three 
different survey institutes predicted an initial statistical dead heat between Kibaki and 
Odinga and later that Odinga would win the election by a tiny (and up to the election day 
ever-changing) margin of about four percent. In line with politically correct media policy 
in regards to ethnicity, the electoral ethnic groups were never mentioned by the newspa-
pers, neither before nor during the post-election violence. However, the figures presented 
by the opinion polls were reduced to the provincial level. Given the territorial spread of 
ethnicities in Kenya, this made it possible for everyone to read the polls in ethnic terms. 
The ethnic pattern that emerged was largely the same as it had been during the constitu-
tional referendum held in 2005; Kibaki was predicted to win approximately 90% of votes in 
Central Province, and Odinga was set to win Nyanza with approximately 84%. The distribu-
tion of votes does not appear to vary much with regard to the remaining provinces. In terms 
of the aforementioned demographic specificities of the Kenyan electorate and the ethnic 
spin the campaigns had taken, Mutua states that the projected dead heat made it clear “that 
the election would also be determined by voter turnout. Whichever candidate drove more 
of his supporters to the polls would most likely win it” (Mutua 2008: 243). 
2.3 Nairobi and its slums 
The city of Nairobi is as old as its informal settlements, and while this paper highlights the 
darker aspects of its slums, it is, nonetheless, important to remember that they are “just 
like all communities, places where people live, work, eat, sleep and raise their children” 
(AI 2009: 6).18 Taken together, all informal settlements occupy only 5% of the city's residen-
tial area and just 1% of all land in the city.19 Nairobi's richest 10% command 45.2% of the 
city's total income; the poorest 10% command only 1.6%. Of Nairobi's total population of 3-
4 million, about 50% live in the slums; this adds up to an extremely high population density, 
which is even more pressing given that about 75% of population growth is absorbed by the 
informal settlements (AI 2009; also UN-Habitat 2003: 219; UN-Habitat 2006: 6-7).  
Kibera and Mathare are Nairobi’s largest and most (in-)famous slums. Kibera emerged 
in 1912 when a group of former soldiers from the Nubian community, who had served in 
the British army, were granted temporary rights to settle on a small area southwest of 
Nairobi's city centre. Today, about one million people live on about 550 acres of Kibera 
land, most of it owned by the government. Despite “resistance at the grassroots level to 
the politics of ethnic hatred” (de Smedt 2009: 585), Kibera’s ‘big man’ in charge can still 
clearly be identified: It is Raila Odinga, an ethnic Luo, former ODM presidential aspirant, 
and who, at present, serves as Kenya’s Prime Minister. Mathare was established in the 
1960s by mainly Kikuyu independence fighters. Today, however, the slum is generally not 
considered to be dominated or claimed by any specific ethnic group. Therefore, no single 
 
 
18  Regarding Nairobi’s historical development and present-day conditions, see Neuwirth (2006: 91-99); 
Kramer (2006: 53-82); Amnesty International (2009: 3-11). 
19  As of most African cities, Nairobi’s spatial structure remains constrained by its colonial past. Though at 
present, income has replaced ethnicity as a basis of residential segregation, rendering the allocation of 
resources among the suburbs highly dependent upon patron-client relations (Pacione 2006: 471, 591). 
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‘big man’ who dominates the scene exists in Mathare. Currently, the settlement's popula-
tion is estimated to range between 300,000 and 500,000 people. While part of the settle-
ment is located on government-owned public land, the majority of it is located on land 
owned by private companies and individuals (AI 2009: 4; Davis 2006: 95). Kramer (also 
Neuwirth 2006: 98) observes that 
“much like in Kibera, people in Mathare Valley live in dense, deplorable conditions and 
neighborhoods developed along tribal lines. Here, well-established landlords are Kikuyu, 
and more recent tenants are Luos of the Nyanza Province. Luos comprise the majority of 
the settlement, and women head most households” (Kramer 2006: 69). 
3.  Nairobi burning 
This chapter will explore the divisive characteristics of violence in Nairobi. The declared 
aim is to identify how violence unfolded in the city from the perspective of Nairobi’s 
slum-dwellers, utilizing a comprehensive empirical basis.  
3.1 Temporal pattern of violence  
Figure 1: Temporal pattern of violence in Nairobi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation. The graph is based on a quantitative analysis of the violent incidents 
in Nairobi as reported by the newspapers The Nation and The Standard as well as additional tem-
poral information found in the available literature. 
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Figure 1 reveals a clear-cut connection between a rise in the intensity of acts of violence of 
all sorts (see below chap. 3.3) and the unfolding of events on the political stage. Hereafter, 
factors such as the role of rumours driving the slum joint behaviour of the slum-dwellers 
before and during the post-election violence, their shared perception of the (rigged) 
election as trigger (and justification) for violent action, and the identified lull between the 
trigger and the outbreak of violence are discussed. Subsequently, the sudden end to 
violence at the end of February 2008 is put under analytic scrutiny. 
Rumours 
“I once received an SMS that 20 people had been burnt alive inside a bus destined for 
western Kenya. […] Yet, this was just a baseless and alarming rumour.”20 
Before Election Day, rumours about government plans to rig the election circulated in the 
slums. Yet, it was only after the outbreak of violence that rumours became markedly im-
portant to the slum-dwellers. In the midst of increasing isolation of the slums and a loss 
in trust in the media, rumours became vital sources of information. In Kibera and 
Mathare, for example, people spread news of the coming of the Mungiki. Such Mungiki-
rumours prompted local people to assemble on the streets at night to keep watch or lock 
themselves up in their homes.21 In Kibera, stories about soldiers from Uganda crossing 
the border and killing innocent Kenyans were circulated. They were said to have done so 
on request from Kibaki, allegedly an old school friend of Musoveni’s.22 Furthermore, ru-
mours were spread about suspicious vehicles (associated with the government) moving 
through Kibera during times when no other vehicles were allowed to operate.23 In 
Mathare, SMS messages are also said to have incited people to violence. (Alice, Mathare: 93-
94, in: NUP). While a defining characteristic of rumours is that their origins are unknown, 
their primary function in Nairobi’s slums was doubtlessly to arouse local communities to 
action. They did so by delivering warnings of impending attacks by members of opposing 
ethnic groups or by depicting gruesome scenarios, justifying offensive violent actions.24 The 
slum-dwellers generally considered actions in response to rumours as self-defence. 
Trigger 
“The tension was there before the election. So, the elections came and it was being rigged 
off. So ... So our right was not exercised” (Henry, Kibera: 19-20, in: NUP). 
 
 
20  Unknown Kenyan, quoted in: Standard (6.2.2008: 7): “Violence and Rumours” by Oywa, John; Kareithi, 
Amos. 
21  Calvin, Mathare: 227-228 and Frank, Kibera: 13, in: NUP. 
22  Dennis, Mathare: 34-42, in: NUP; Colin, Mathare: 52-60, in: NUP; Nation (15.1.2008: 2): “No Uganda 
troops in Kenya: Mutua says”, no Author. Standard (19.1.2008: 5): “Rumours persist on Ugandan sol-
diers by Makabila, Stephen; Nyaboke, Jessica. Standard (24.1.2008): “Ugandan army uniforms found” by 
Wanyonyi, Robert. Standard (7.2.2008): “No Ugandan troops in Kenya, says Museveni” by Wanyonyi, 
Robert; Mwai, Elizabeth. 
23  Alvin, Kibera: 119-121 and Frank, Kibera: 15, in: NUP. 
24  Nation (29.2.2008: 33): “I accuse the Press for igniting post election violence: fact or scapegoat?” by 
Oriare, Frank. Nation (20.1.2008): “Text your friend a message of peace” by Wambugu, Sam; see also 
Standard (5.2.2008): “Water poisoning fears dispelled” by Saturday Standard Team. Standard (6.2.2008: 
7): “Violence and Rumours” by Oywa, John; Kareithi, Amos. Also Waki (2008). 
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In Nairobi, post-election violence was precipitated by the perceived rigging of the electi-
ons and triggered by an announcement by the President. The opposition was ahead by 
approximately 1 million votes in the first days of the public tallying. This incited people to 
begin celebrating in the streets of the slums. However, these ODM supporters felt betray-
ed the very moment the tide turned and the PNU pulled ahead. This rapid turnaround 
was identified as the prime cause for the eruption of violence. From an analytical point of 
view, it was of little significance whether the turnaround in vote yields was due to actual 
acts of election rigging or if they were a result of the delayed tallying of votes from Central 
Kenya, which is Kikuyu-dominated and, as such, a well-established PNU area.25 As a con-
sequence, on ODM-organised protest marches down the city’s arterial roads towards the 
city centre, members of the opposition community served as targets for the provoked 
mass’ wrath. Thus, clashes with the police erupted and the Kikuyu were selectively targe-
ted. The perceived rigging of the election remains the slum-dwellers primary argument 
validating the necessity of violence – the outbreak of which was preceded by a deadly 
quiet, the lull. 
Lull 
“This thing actually started 27th when we voted, tension was high. And now, we voted on 
27th, 28th, then 29th, it was everybody was anxiously waiting for the answers […], during 
that time everything stood: there was no any work going on, because everybody was just 
about elections and it was about politics […]. And now, when it reached on 29th people felt 
impatient because they were now not releasing the answers as usually, […] Now, everything 
stood, politics were doing what, everything just stood there, people wanted to be relieved so 
they can work, yea, when it reached on 30th from 29th we were just hanging around on the 
road there. […] there was a lot of tension; you can't open [a shop] because even by that time 
we didn't have government here.” (Alvin, Kibera: 2-6, in: NUP; see also 25-26). 
In the slums, a lull can be identified beginning on the generally peaceful Election Day 
(December 27, 2007) – or, more precisely, from the moment the live-broadcasted tallying 
of votes was halted – to the announcement of the president. It was only then that violence 
finally broke out. Life during this lull (i.e. the 27th to the 30th of December, 2007) can be 
said to have stood still, not only in the impoverished areas but indeed all across the city of 
Nairobi.26 During the lull, the already limited trust in state institutions and government 
authorities deteriorated rapidly. The information vacuum was perceived by the slum-
dwellers as unbearable, thereby increasing the circulation and importance of rumours. 
(Frank, Kibera: 4, in: NUP). Tensions rose and group passions boiled high as ODM sup-
porters started to assemble in the streets of the slums, driven by the urge to finally find 
out what was going on. Like the post-election violence that followed, the lull was all-
 
 
25  Colin, Kibera: 19-20; Alvin, Kibera: 41-43; Alice, Mathare; Calvin, Mathare; Dennis, Kibera: 21-25; Elvis, 
Mathare: 54-55, all in: NUP; Standard (9.2.2008): “Learning interrupted ...” by Mureu, Lynesther. See al-
so Nation (12.1.2008: 3): “Young people speak out on election fighting” no Author. Nation (28.1.2008: 
6): “Camp for displaced people closed down” by Wafula, Carline. Also KNCHR (2008a: 36). 
26  Calvin, Mathare: 7-9, 152-154; Alvin, Kibera: 2-6, see also 25-26; Frank, Kibera: 4), all in: NUP; Standard 
(6.1.2008: 16-17): “The time that Kenyans swam in sea of chaos” by Aluanga, Lillian. Standard 
(30.12.2008): “Final days of December '07: A journalist's memoirs” by Mochama, Tony, in: 
www.eastandard.net/politics/InsidePage.php?id=1144002844&cid=289& (9.12.2009). 
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consuming in the sense that through their being trapped inside the slums and isolated 
from the outside world, the slum-dwellers were not able to escape an atmosphere of in-
tensifying polarisation. During the lull, everyone had to show their political colours and, 
by so doing, ethnic affiliation, with all of its (potentially fatal) consequences once large-
scale violence erupted. 
Due to their importance to the overall analysis, the characteristics of violence that fea-
tured in the slums during the period of unrest will be elaborated on in a separate chapter, 
once the temporal and spatial patterns of violence have been sufficiently presented (see 
below chap. 3.3). 
End/Consequences 
“They [the Kikuyu] live but they are not comfortable as so they were living initially […] not 
comfortable as they were by that time. […] They know tensions, are still high to them. […] 
When something, when the government performs poorly, when now people are just 
expressing their anger. Expressing their anger to destroy something left. Destroy something 
that the government will feel” (Alvin, Kibera: 137-138, in: NUP). 
The post-election violence came to an end in Nairobi (as well as elsewhere in the coun-
try), firstly, on account of the fact that the undisputed leaders of both factions eventually 
sent their supporters unambiguous signals, which were interpreted as authoritative by 
slum-dwellers of both ethno-political alliances.27 The second factor was the accomplish-
ment of ethnic homogenisation in the slums by means of violence. Evidently for the slum-
dwellers, the benefits of ending the state of general lawlessness outweighed the material 
and immaterial costs of continuing violence. This is not to say that they materially benefi-
ted from the post-election violence. On the contrary: apart from a few who may have be-
nefited, many more lost their primary means of income, not to mention the personal los-
ses and psychological traumas incurred. Weighing the informants' accounts against the 
above-presented general information of the impacts of post-election violence, it would be 
safe to assume that a majority of slum-dwellers still suffer up to the present day from lega-
cies of violence in one way or another.28 
Lastly, the relative calm that has settled over the city's slums is largely considered a 
highly unstable one. With the underlying socio-economic problems of the urban poor 
having neither been solved nor seriously addressed, the promise of electoral change looms 
ominously on the horizon, ready to once more spur the anxious ODM supporters to vio-
lence when the time is ripe. On the other hand, for the PNU-associated Kikuyu commu-
nity, the promise of electoral change constitutes an immense threat that lingers above the 
slums, ready to trigger and/or justify pre-emptive strikes.29 Consequently, the post-
violence period is not so much perceived as a period of inter-group reconciliation or co-
operation, but rather as a period of anxious waiting. In such a period, inter-group coope-
ration is possible, as long as neither side lowers its guard. In Calvin’s words: 
 
 
27  Dylan, Mathare/Korogocho: 11-12; Warlord, Mathare: 53-55; Calvin, Mathare: 114-122, all in: NUP. 
28  Alvin, Kibera: 132-134, 137-138, see also Dennis Kibera, 3-5; Edgar, Kibera: 23-25, all in: NUP. 
29  Warlord, Mathare: 126-127 and Calvin, Mathare: 251-252, in: NUP. 
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 “Because for me, for us, for the next election, I see that in Kenya, still there is still that fight. 
[…] Meaning […], during the 2012 election, it will just be the same” (Calvin, Mathare: 251-
252, in: NUP). 
3.2 Spatial patterns of violence 
Figure 2: Map of Nairobi 
Source: Author’s compilation (base map derived from the OpenStreetMap project). 
 
“On one side of the police cordons, Kenya's middle classes were paranoid but protected; on 
the other, slum-dwellers slaughtered one another” (Wong 2009: 311). 
Figure 2 shows Narobi’s cluster-like pattern that surrounds Kenya’s political heart – its 
government and parliament district, the Central Business District, and neighbouring 
Uhuru Park. Upon first glance, both Kibera (in the southwest) and Mathare (in the north-
east) are located only a few kilometres away from the city centre. They are linked to it on 
one side by Nairobi’s main arterials Ngong Road and Langata Road, and by Thika Road 
on the other. In this section, some general observations on the spatial pattern of violence 
in Nairobi are presented, followed by more detailed discussions of how violence unfolded 
in the slums of Kibera, Mathare and the areas beyond. It was noted at the outset that vio-
lence erupted overwhelmingly within the slums and along their boundaries in Nairobi 
(see UNEP 2008). 
During the post-election violence, Nairobi’s slums were not only forcefully segregated 
from the larger city, but also violently fragmented into various ethnic enclaves. The proc-
esses leading to the creation of ethnically homogenous areas (or areas perceived as such) 
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within the slums will hereafter be referred to as ethnic zoning measures, spatially resulting 
in ethnic zones. Ethnic zones are, in relation to slum-dwellers, the visible territorial out-
comes of intense ethnic polarisation and the consequent inter-ethnic fragmentation proc-
esses. They are, first and foremost, ethnic in character but referred to by the slum-
dwellers in political terms. That is, depending on the local inter-ethnic power balance, 
people either refer to them as ODM zones (or ‘strongholds’ of Raila Odinga), or as PNU 
zones (or ‘strongholds’ of President Kibaki). As a general rule, these zones are said to be 
congruent with administrative and geographic divisions in the slums. When talking about 
ethnic zones in the slums, reference to the national level is common place. This directly 
links the ongoing zoning measures in Nairobi to the previously-presented idea of majim-
boism. During the post-election violence, traditional myths about the existence of ‘ances-
tral homelands’ – considered to be bound to specific ethnic communities by blood – were 
transferred to Nairobi’s suburbs and violently enforced.30 
This had several consequences: Ethnic identities were checked by vigilante groups at 
zone boundaries, inter-group clashes occurred mostly along such boundaries, and the 
slum-dwellers adjusted their daily movements with regard to the location of ethnic zones 
(e.g. by avoiding zones held by members of opposing ethnic communities). (Individual) 
movement was generally considered a dangerous activity and therefore limited to the 
search for groceries, to obtaining information and news, to engaging in (violent) protests, 
and/or to participating in vigilante groups (Calvin, Mathare: 32, in: NUP). During the 
post-election violence, Nairobi’s slum-dwellers wanted to get as close to the centre of 
politics as possible.31 Given that the heart of Kenyan politics is located at the centre of 
Nairobi's, the star-like arterial roads leading to the city centre became heavily contested 
grounds.32 Clashes between the slum-dwellers and police forces unfolded on these arterial 
roads and, to an even greater extent, along the smaller roads, as it was here that heavy 
police forces were deployed to cordon off the areas.33 “The chaos”, Calvin narrates with 
regard to looting and burning, “came out just at the roads.”34 The Nation described the 
unfolding of events as follows: 
“Anti-riot police were engaged in running battles in the city's Mathare, Kibera and 
Dagoretti areas in an effort to stop ODM supporters from making their way to Uhuru Park, 
the venue of the rally, which was sealed off by GSU officers”35 
 
 
30  For a cartographic analysis of the post-election violence on a national level that backs this conclusion for 
Kenya’s impoverished urban areas see Calas (2008).  
31  Dennis, Mathare: 19 and Alvin, Kibera: 67, in: NUP. 
32  Frank, Kibera: 4-6, 15 and Edgar, Kibera: 37, in: NUP. 
33  Dennis, Kibera: 18-22; Edgar, Kibera: 34-39; Alvin, Kibera: 36-39, 68, 80-81; Arleen, Kibera: 102; Calvin, 
Mathare: 10); Alvin, Kibera: 63); Angela, Kibera: 114, all in: NUP. 
34  Calvin, Mathare: 269, in: NUP, see also Alice, Mathare: 6, in: NUP. 
35  GSU: General Service Unit, a special branch of the Kenyan police forces under presidential command. 
Nation (18.01.2008: 1-2): “8 more killed in chaos” and “Tight police knot in the city as park cordoned 
off” by Nation Team. See also: Standard (27.01.08: 20-21): “Kibera lies in ruins a month later” by Aluan-
ga, Lillian. Wong (2009: 310, 313); Waki (2008: 198f); KNCHR (2008a: 40f); UNEP (2008); UNOSAT 
(2008). 
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3.2.1 Kibera 
Figure 3: Spatial pattern of violence in Kibera 
 
Source: Author’s compilation (base map derived from the OpenStreetMap project)36 
 
“In this area, a lot of people are Luo. So they say: 'This is our place' and Kikuyu they have to 
go. They have to go to their... [home], most Kikuyu come from a place called Nyeri or 
Central. […] That was the reason why they had to leave. And summon they ID card, 
identify yourself and go on” (Angela, Kibera: 51-52, in: NUP). 
During the pre-election period and also during the post-election violence, the multi-
ethnic slum of Kibera was considered an ODM stronghold.37 Hence, the Luo-community 
considered Kibera to be their exclusive ethnic domain – at the expense of other ethnic 
communities (again primarily the Kikuyu). The perception of Kibera as Luo domain is 
facilitated by a Kenyan agreement between the tribal baron, the political party and the 
people. Because Kibera is part of Langata constituency – the long-term electoral constitu-
ency of MP Raila Odinga – it is commonly believed to belong to the ODM presidential 
candidate and to the Luo tribal leader, Odinga. The reciprocal nature of leader-follower 
relations made it obligatory for members of the Luo ethnic group in Kibera to assume 
 
 
36  Note that due to the research design at hand (and here mainly due to resource and sample limitations), 
the provided maps reveal only fragments of the de facto ethnic zoning measures in the slums. Neverthe-
less, all spatially relevant references made by the informants have been incorporated and can, based on 
the information provided by secondary data sources, somewhat safely be considered exemplary for the 
spatial pattern of violence in the slums of Nairobi. 
37  Alvin, Kibera: 43, 97-98; Frank, Kibera: 8; Angela, Kibera: 51-52, all in: NUP. 
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power in their political leader's electoral stronghold. Gaining ethnic dominance in Kibera 
has, of course, involved the victimisation of the ethnic others, who had hitherto held – 
according to one group's shared perception – powerful positions in the area: the Kikuyu. 
While other ethnic zones surely exist within the slum, Kibera's village of Laina Saba is 
specifically accentuated on the map because the area has been dominated by the Kikuyu 
for decades. During the post-election violence, Laina Saba was turned into an ethnic zo-
ne, with ethnic skirmishes erupting all along the zone's invisible (but highly present) 
boundary. Oceans, on the other hand, is a Luo-dominated village. During the post-
election violence, the village was turned into an ethnic zone with the majority ethnic 
group, the Luo, taking control by setting up vigilante groups and forcefully evicting 
members of the Kikuyu (and aligned ethnic others). 
Large-scale looting was generally witnessed taking place outside of the slum, specifi-
cally targeting supermarkets along Ngong Road. Inner-slum looting took place mainly 
along the slum's main road, Kibera Drive. These claims are supported by UNOSAT 
(2008), which reveals that the businesses along Kibera Drive and Toi Market, which is 
located along the looters' route to Ngong Road, were destroyed by large-scale burning 
during post-election violence. In both cases, looting went hand-in-hand with clashes in-
volving police forces, and it may be assumed that they were primarily driven by material 
needs. The police forces were concentrated along the slum's only paved road, Kibera 
Drive, and along Nairobi's arterial Ngong Road. Subsequently, clashes between police 
forces and slum-dwellers erupted mainly along these roads. When police forces set out to 
patrol the slum, they were ordered to avoid the narrow pathways and instead remained on 
the few larger dirt roads and the railway line. The railway line, which is vital for the econ-
omy of Kenya’s landlocked neighbour Uganda, must be mentioned due to its deep impact 
on the Kibera's residents’ collective memory. Located on an elevatation, the railway line 
provided the patrolling police forces with a tactical advantage when quelling violence perpe-
trated by the slum-dwellers (or to stage offensives when deemed necessary) (Alvin: Kibera, 
36-37, in: NUP). Whatever the nature of the police's modus operandi during such raids from 
the railway line, slum-dwellers generally connotate these raids with the excessive use of 
force and the acceptance of unnecessary casualties on the side of their fellow poor. 
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3.2.2 Mathare 
Figure 4: Spatial pattern of violence in Mathare Valley 
Source: Author’s compilation (base map derived from the OpenStreetMap project). 
“So, Kikuyu were just killing Luos. Luos were killing Kikuyu. So if a Luo passed through 
there, if you are from this tribe, you are a Luo, it could be difficult for him to go to the other 
side. Because it's a different zone. It is Kikuyu’s” (Curt, Mathare: 2-4, in: NUP). 
Unlike Kibera, Mathare Valley is not perceived as a stronghold for any specific ethnic 
group.38 With no dominant group claiming the slum as a whole, zoning measures were 
limited to the neighbourhood level and to Mathare's administrative areas. The relevance 
of the neighbourhood level derives from the fact that ethnic dominance has mostly been 
established in small neighbourhood entities, primarily based on concrete security con-
cerns. This explains the set-up of vigilante groups or the reliance on local strongmen to 
provide security for the immediate neighbourhood. Where group dominance did exist (or 
was forcefully implemented), beyond the immediate neighbourhood, zoning measures 
were enacted. The Kikuyu-dominated zone of Mathare Area 2 and the Luo-dominated 
zone of Mathare 4A are prime examples. The neighbouring slums of Kariobangi and Ko-
rogocho provide a similar example. Korogocho was perceived by slum-dwellers as having 
 
 
38  Curt, Mathare: 2-4, see also Calvin, Mathare: 84; Elvis, Mathare: 108-112; Edwin, Mathare: 134-137; Ian, 
Mathare: 3-4; Garret: 2-3, 10; Casper, Mathare: 2-3, all in: NUP. 
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been divided down the middle between the Luo and the Kikuyu (both groups again sup-
ported by their politically aligned communities). 
One of the specific characteristics of Mathare North Area 2 is that looters were gener-
ally believed to have entered from the outside, often from the neighbouring areas of 
Kariobangi and Korogocho. In order to loot, the outsiders were said to have left the Ki-
kuyu-dominated area of Kariobangi and go to areas where they were unknown by the 
local residents, who were seeking ethnically different targets.39 UNOSAT (2008) reveals 
that the Huruma area of Mathare Valley was heavily destroyed during the post-election 
violence. Huruma is commonly considered to be a place where many Kikuyu live, al-
though no ethnic dominance is actually apparent. Moreover, the building structure is very 
different from other parts of Mathare. Like Kibera, Huruma consists mostly of easily-
flammable shacks. Though Kikuyu property was selectively targeted for looting and ar-
son, flames quickly wrought havoc on all ethnic groups living in the area. In Mathare, as 
in Kibera, zone boundaries were generally perceived to be the staging ground for inter-
ethnic clashes during post-election violence. Clashes with police forces in Mathare resem-
bled those in Kibera. Being overwhelmed in the slum, police forces were deployed in great 
numbers along Nairobi's arterial Thika Road and two paved roads connecting Mathare 
with Thika Road.40 The preponderance of violence along Thika Road, in the case of 
Mathare, and along Ngong Road, in the case of Kibera, is particularly striking, especially 
given that maps reveal the existence of alternative roads bordering the slums: Langata 
Road, south of Kibera, and Jujua Road, south of Mathare. Why, the reader might ask, did 
the slum-dwellers not spread their protests to these roads? Nairobi's physical structure 
plays a role here: Compared to the acceptable condition of Thika Road (two lanes, fully 
paved), Jujua Road is a dirt road in poor condition. The street could not accommodate 
mass demonstrations and did not provide for space to retreat, which is necessary in vio-
lent clashes with the police. Moreover, Jujua Road passes through the run-down, Somali-
dominated residential estate of Eastleigh and is bordered by an Kenyan military air-force 
base. The local IDP camp was set-up in the base and slum-dwellers unanimously consider 
the army to be too great a force to engage. 
3.3 Characteristics of violence 
“It was spontaneously. No politicians said to the people 'All kill them' because they are Kikuyu 
or because they are Luo. People just became organised, you know the election was so close, 
even the predictions were fifty-fifty” (Elvis, Mathare: 50-53, in: NUP; see also 76-78). 
While the public behaviour of numerous Kenyan politicians, various investigative reports, 
and the ICC’s ongoing inquiry all give rise to different conclusions, the limited informa-
tion provided by the informants suggests that local organisation and planning were absent 
in the slums during the pre-violence period. This does not mean, however, that ethnic 
 
 
39  Dylan, Mathare/Korogocho: 3-6 and John, Mathare: 4-5, in: NUP; see also Stephen, Mathare: 3 and Jack, 
Korogocho: 3-5, in: NUP. 
40  Alice, Mathare: 68; Calvin, Mathare: 89-94, 268-269; Warlord, Mathare: 885, 116-121; Casper, Mathare: 
5, all in: NUP. 
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others were not clearly identifiable during the deathly quiet before the storm (the lull); 
they certainly were. The information is also silent on plausible accusations, which suggest 
that politicians from both camps fuelled ethnic tensions before the elections and engaged 
in incitement during the clashes – e.g. by collaborating with patronage-dependent local 
leaders or native dialect radio stations. This implies that, as far as slum-dwellers perceived 
things, organisation appeared only after the initial eruption of violence. Moreover, ele-
ments of organisation are primarily reported to have served defensive purposes, such as 
setting up vigilante and/or neighbourhood watch groups within immediate neighbour-
hoods.41 Violent group offensives, on the other hand, were perceived as entirely in the 
hands of criminal gangs, which, by their very nature, exhibited a degree of organisation 
and could quite easily be instrumentalised by (local) strong men. 
In the section that follows, the dominant types of violence that occurred in Nairobi are 
presented from a slum-dweller’s perspective. What emerges is that during the post-
election violence, the fine analytical line separating acts of violence motivated by either 
ethnical, political, and instrumental considerations were more or less entirely blurred. 
When considering the slum-dwellers as a whole, instrumental considerations seem to 
have generally outweighed ethnic ones. Nevertheless, several inter-ethnic preconditions 
were necessary for the outbreak of any act of violence committed during the post-election 
violence period. These were: the joint accumulation of inter-ethnic hostility, a joint feel-
ing of inner-ethnic solidarity even with perpetrators of violence, and the subsequent joint 
targeting of ethnic others at times when and locations where they were especially vulner-
able. These preconditions will now be elaborated on in an empirical account of violence 
against people and property in Nairobi, as experienced by the slum-dwellers and commit-
ted by some of their impoverished peers. 
Violence against people 
“Yeah I saw it! […] You know there are some places where you don’t want to go. […] That 
place was so bad. That place was so bad. There is a person, this man who is being stoned to 
death. A Luo. A vehicle being put fire by Luo. Also two Ladies, fighting one another. 
Probably she is a Kikuyu, she is a Luo. This is a neighbour trying to kill the neighbour” 
(Kinuthai, Mathare: 5-8, in: NUP). 
The vast majority of the slum-dwellers who engaged in the post-election violence refrai-
ned from lethal attacks. Those who attacked their fellow slum-dwellers did so based on a 
mixture of motivations, consisting of ethnic and instrumental elements.42 Those who en-
gaged in clashes with the police were primarily motivated politically, at least initially. 
They targeted the police since the latter were seen as representatives of those deemed re-
sponsible for rigging the elections (the trigger). Moreover, police forces were easy targets 
and readily aroused group action. Killing was explicitly absent from the protesting slum-
 
 
41  Calvin, Mathare: 148-150; Arleen, Kibera: 75-81; Angela, Kibera: 112-117; Elvis, Mathare: 50-53, 76-78, 
all in: NUP. 
42  Dylan, Mathare/Korogocho: 8; Garret, Mathare: 5-8; Curt, Mathare: 2-3; Dexter, Mathare: 4; Calvin, 
Mathare: 134-135; Elvis, Mathare: 25-29; Clyde, Kibera: 5-8; Dennis, Kibera: 26-27; Alvin, Kibera: 87-89, 
91, all in: NUP. 
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dwellers' agenda. Ironically, killing heavily-armed policemen would not only have been 
difficult, but it was generally considered to be counter-productive given the anticipated 
lethal backlash.43 During the post-election violence, any sort of object deemed suitable for 
fighting was turned into a weapon, though pangas (machetes) as well as rungus (clubs) 
dominated the scene.44 These and other weapon-like tools were looted from supermarkets 
and hardware stores.45 While their weapons were no match for the police forces’ guns, the 
appeal of powerfully releasing their anger at the regime considerably motivated young 
male slum-dwellers in Kibera. As Dennis and Hardy state: 
“So they can see it is from the practice of the poor it is only that we didn't get the guns. […] 
But we, if we even had guns... […] If we had guns, we had shoot all of them. Even now you 
could not have been in here. Until now!”46 
Acts of sexual violence committed in the slums were of an entirely different nature than 
acts of violence directed at representatives of the incumbent regime. As in other conflict 
environments, sexual violence was used to punish or degrade members of the opposing 
ethnic groups.47 Women and children were particularly targeted for rape in Nairobi's in-
formal settlements and opportunistic rape was reported in the city’s IDP camps. (KNCHR 
2008a: 8, 41). In Alice’s words: “I saw women crying, children who were so desperate they 
did not have someone to help them. I also heard women talk of what they have gone 
through...” (Alice, Mathare: 56-57, in: NUP). At the same time, sexual violence against 
men was also an issue. The forceful circumcision of men, for example, was considered a 
symbolic act and was utilised to undermine the authority of a group’s political leader. 
Alvin explains: 
“So they know very well, Luos according to their tradition they don't circumcise and 
Kikuyus that's according to their... they always do that. So if you catch a Luo and circumcise 
if you do it just now, you are not a real Luo” (Alvin, Kibera: 97-98, in: NUP). 
Violence against property 
“So up to this time, people have fear. They can't allow the Luos to stay in their houses if you 
are a Kikuyu. And if you are a Luo, you would not allow a Kikuyu to stay in their homes. 
You have to get their ID” (Alice, Mathare: 40-53, in: NUP). 
During the post-election violence, long-brewing rent tensions were violently addressed. 
These were rooted in the real and/or perceived ownership discrepancies between the Ki-
kuyu and the Luo. In the slums, the Kikuyu are generally considered the landlords and the 
vast majority of Luo the tenants.48 While the rent-issue is directly linked with the frag-
mentation of the slum in zones dominated by either Kikuyu or Luo in Mathare, this par-
allel is not identified by informants in Kibera. Here, the phenomenon is said to prevail in 
all of the slum's villages. Acts of rent-related violence were clearly motivated by a mixture 
 
 
43  Casper, Mathare: 4, 9, and George, Mathare: 5-6, in: NUP. 
44  Colin, Kibera: 3-5, see also Calvin, Mathare: 108-114, in: NUP. 
45  Calvin, Mathare: 108-114; Dennis, Kibera: 10-11; Edgar, Kibera: 28. 
46  Dennis/Hardy, Kibera: 6-7, in: NUP; also Edgar, Kibera: 21, in: NUP. 
47  Alice, Mathare: 17-25, 56-57; Alvin, Kibera: 97-98; Angela, Kibera: 132-135, all in: NUP. 
48  Alice, Mathare: 40-53; Elvis, Mathare: 64-75, 116-124; Alvin, Kibera: 73-76; Frank, Kibera: 11, all in: NUP. 
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of political, ethnic and instrumental considerations. For the opposition supporting Luo 
slum-dwellers, the eviction of mainly Kikuyu landlords was a necessary objective on the 
way to solving decades-long social injustices. Despite ambivalence and doubt at the indi-
vidual level, ODM supporters as a group not only accepted violent methods for forcefully 
evicting Kikuyu landlords, but, furthermore, they also saw them as appropriate in the 
sense of ends justifying the means (Alvin, Kibera: 73-76, in: NUP). Members of the tar-
geted Kikuyu community, on the other hand, likewise argued in favour of the forceful 
eviction of Luo tenants from their zones and utilized force for regaining their property by 
means of hiring vigilante groups/gangs or by calling in police forces (Alice, Mathare: 40-
53, in: NUP). The clashes between local groups of vigilantes and/or gangs over the control 
of certain areas in the slums – reported up to the present day – have to be considered with 
this rent issue in mind. Violent solutions for unresolved material problems, such as rent, 
have caused long-term repercussions.49 Beneficiaries of violent redistribution are gener-
ally not the poor, but gangs, criminals and (organised) perpetrators. They are the ones 
who largely control the former Kikuyu-held property today and have subsequently en-
trenched their power bases in the slums. 
Assuming that the burning of property in the slums was wilfully conducted and driven 
by inter-ethnic animosity and not an unintended side-effect of the violent clashes, this 
course of action can be said to have completely backfired on the perpetrators. Even when 
Kikuyu property was selectively targeted (e.g. at the formerly Kikuyu-dominated Toi Mar-
ket, see above Figure 3),50 all slum-dwellers seem to have been affected by the resulting loss 
of property and income.51 While acts of looting were, first and foremost, committed for 
instrumental/material reasons (need-driven looting), the ethnic undertone is generally ap-
parent. Against the backdrop of poverty in the slums – which the perpetrators were well 
aware of and which was intensified with each day of post-election violence – the looting of 
property was almost universally justified by slum-dwellers.52 Participation in need-driven 
looting, especially the looting of grocery stores that accompanied the chaos unfolding on the 
streets, was equally considered legitimate. In the words of a local strongman’s right hand:  
“They were taking this opportunity when there was fighting. Now ... People came from, this is 
Mathare North, so people came from Rome, Mariadon, Kariobangi ... They come to loot 
because of being because of not being prosecuted” (First Officer: 35-37, in: NUP; see also 106). 
Apart from supermarkets/shops which were looted during the violent clashes with police 
forces during the ODM supporter marches to the city centre, the ethnic zoning measures 
in the slums defined which properties would be targeted for looting.53 This explains the 
 
 
49  Nation (15.2.2008: 3):“The poor 'inherit' homes after chaos” by Kopecky, Arno. Standard (25.2.2008: 
13): “Slums the new battle front as gangs evict landlords” by Kareithi, Amos. Waki (2008: 195), KNCHR 
(2008a: 40). 
50  Edgar, Kibera: 149-157; Dylan, Mathare/Korogocho: 9; Alice, Mathare: 6, all in: NUP. 
51  Edgar, Kibera: 155-162; Calvin, Mathare: 268-269, in: NUP. 
52  Calvin, Mathare: 271; Colin, Mathare/Kisumu: 5; Benton, Mathare/Kisumu: 4-6; Alvin, Kibera: 37-39, all 
in: NUP. 
53  Alvin, Kibera: 37-39, see also Curt, Mathare: 5, 6, 10; Calvin, Mathare: 82-84, 105-113; Dennis, Kibera: 
11; Alvin, Kibera: 67-68, all in: NUP. 
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raid-like looting trips across zone boundaries within or across a slum as narrated by slum-
dwellers, as well as the establishment of vigilante groups to patrol their group's immediate 
neighbourhood.54 Similarly, acts of violence against Matatus55 and other vehicles were 
reported to have been conducted almost exclusively for instrumental reasons, specifically 
by the real and/or perceived need to provide for one’s survival in the slums, since they 
were violently cordoned off by police. In Calvin’s words: 
“But for the slums, we were just struggling. [...] For myself, I stayed for one day without 
taking tea, or supper, or lunch. There is, even if you have money, there is nowhere to buy, 
so you have to steal!” (Calvin, Mathare: 267, in: NUP) 
With transport coming to a stand-still in Nairobi, supply shortages were quickly felt by 
the slum-dwellers who, even in times of peace, had neither the financial means nor the 
physical possibility for stockpiling.56 The few operating vehicles quickly became targeted 
for looting or were exploited to make a quick profit by providing 'security' for vehicles 
operating within a group's demarcated area.57 Either way, it is clear that vehicles were not 
selectively targeted based on ethnic considerations, but targeted quite simply because they 
were comparatively easy targets. Large-scale looting was made possible by the complete 
absence of state authorities in the slums; as their chiefs fled, the police were overwhelmed. 
It was also made possible by the preoccupation of local vigilantes with the protection of 
their own turf, and, thirdly, by the silencing of moderate voices like local elders, who, 
during normal times, would provide some degree of justice. Lastly, the dominating at-
mosphere of tension, (inter-ethnic) mistrust and violence, combined with a culture of 
impunity in the slums and provided additional incentives for looting. Any kind of violent 
act by perpetrators who engaged in selective attacks on civilian members of the opposing 
ethnic group were, as reported by the slum-dwellers, either motivated by the desire to 
forcefully evict the ethnic other, or by the desire to inflict harm to their victims. While 
killing was not necessary for achieving the former goal, willing acceptance of acts of muti-
lation, murder, or rapes were necessary for the latter motivation.58 Though the slum-
dwellers generally condemn murders and atrocities committed by members of their own 
groups, little remorse exists in regards to the necessity of evicting the ethnic others. Vic-
timized ethnic others are pitied, but only half-heartedly. In other words, when Nairobi’s 
 
 
54  First Officer, Mathare: 35-37, see also 106 and Dexter, Mathare: 3, in: NUP. 
55  Matatus, privately operated minibuses, are the main means of public transport in Nairobi (as in many 
other parts of Sub-Sahara Africa).  
56  Alvin, Kibera: 37-39; Alice, Mathare: 6; Axel, Mathare/Kisumu: 5; Benton, Mathare/Kisumu: 5; Nation 
(1.2.2008: 2): “Fuel and food shortages loom as shops remain closed” by Ogosia, Kenneth; Wafula, Caro-
line. Nation (6.2.2008: 13): “The day business ground to a standstill” by Warigi, Gitau. Nation (6.2.2008: 
14): “Peacemakers out to restore hope in the country” by Ngunjiri, Calvin. Nation (6.2.2008: 26): “Chaos 
exacts heavy toll on businesses” by Kang'aru, Wachira. See also Nation (28.1.2008: 2): “14 killed and 
thousands flee as violence spreads to Naivasha” by Nation Team. 
57  Bradley, Mathare: 2-4; Casper, Mathare: 3-5; Calvin, Mathare: 20-28; Alice, Mathare: 89-93; Clyde, 
Kibera: 6-10, all in: NUP. 
58  Garret, Mathare: 5-7; Casper, Mathare: 5; Curt, Mathare: 3-4, all in: NUP. 
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slum-dwellers reflect on the use of inter-group violence during the post-election period, 
the means may be strongly denounced, but not the ends. 
4.  Fuelling the flames 
This chapter focuses on five analytical elements, which are put under empirical scrutiny 
in order to enhance our understanding as to why the wave of ethno-political violence in 
Nairobi unfolded as it did. These elements are: inter-ethnic polarization; inter-ethnic 
hostility and targeting; justifications for violence; the supportive social environment; and 
the role of participants, perpetrators and bystanders in acts of violence. 
4.1 Inter-ethnic polarization  
“Here the Luo, they were a community. […] The people used to live together. Not that a 
person can come from outside and come and start violence. It was just you my friend, you 
my neighbour. But the tribalism came inside peoples' hearts. This is about interest and 
tribalism” (Frank: Kibera, 115-121, in: NUP). 
Nairobi's slum-dwellers, regardless of ethnic identity, agree that one’s ethnic identity mir-
rors one’s political affiliation.59 The same is true of the reverse: If someone supports a 
specific political candidate, that person’s choice can typically be traced back to his/her 
ethnic identity. With the disappearance of inter-ethnic individualisation, group ascrip-
tions along stereotyped ethnic lines predominated. Moreover –  and this is crucial – the 
de-individualisation of ethnics others as members of their stereotyped ethnic groups was 
directly related to the political event that triggered violence. Hence, to followers of oppo-
sition parties, every member of a GEMA60 community was a Kibaki supporter, and, as 
such, directly and personally responsible for the perceived election rigging by the Kibaki 
regime.61 Elvis explains: 
“We identify each other with 'He is a Luhya, I am a Luo, the other one is a Kikuyu...' And if 
the leader is a Luhya, then we assume, the people in Mathare or in Kibera who live in the 
streets they assume, because he is a Luhya and Luhya voted for him, then it's the same 
people!” (Elvis, Mathare: 23-26, in: NUP) 
What holds true for inter-group individualisation may equally be valid in regard to intra-
group differentiation: To the slum-dwellers, inner-ethnic loyalty during the post-election 
violence was an irrefutable fact. It was said to be vital for survival and, as such, influenced by 
personal risk-assessment strategies. Within the intensity of ethnic polarisation, safety could 
 
 
59  Alice, Mathare: 3-5; Calvin, Mathare: 7-9, 141-146; John, Mathare: 4-5; Edwin, Mathare: 143-146; Den-
nis, Kibera: 16-17, 21-22; Arleen, Kibera: 82-83, 128-129; Alvin, Kibera: 10, 43-44; Colin, Kibera: 6-12, 
all in: NUP. 
60  ‘GEMA’ is a commonly known term used to refer to the Gikuyu (Kikuyu), Embu, Meru and Akamba 
(Kamba) ethnic communities. 
61  Warlord: Mathare: 2-32, see also Calvin, Mathare: 7-9, 141-146; Alice, Mathare: 12-14, see also 24-25; 
Elvis, Mathare: 23-26, all in: NUP. 
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only be found among one's own people.62 Where ethnic identity excluded this safety, ethnic 
camouflage and strong-hearted friends were needed to evade selective targeting by mem-
bers of the antagonised ethnic group.63 Angela, a Kikuyu, narrates how her neighbour Ar-
leen, a Luo, protected her by offering a hiding place from rioting Luo groups in Mathare:  
“She had to protect me outside there. Then they discovered there is a Kikuyu living here 
they come, kill you and burn everything. […] Most of the people here they don't know my 
tribe. They think this one is married to a Kisii, they think I am a Kisii. I think that was their 
idea. But...”64 
The dominant rhetoric of the post-election violence in ethnic terms, as professed by the 
ODM supporters, describes inter-ethnic clashes in Nairobi's slums as war between the 
Luo and the Kikuyu communities. In this purported war, other communities merely had 
to choose a side. The role of the Nubian community is interesting in relation to this: they 
are infamous among ODM supporters for offering them support solely based on the fact 
that they hold property in the Luo stronghold of Kibera. Their allegiance was thus per-
ceived as partly instrumental (e.g. Nubian landlords rented, like their Kikuyu counter-
parts, to Luo tenants), but was accepted nonetheless. Alvin, a Luo from Kibera, explains 
this phenomenon as follows: 
“because, […] most of these Nubians, are they own their lands here. Around Karanja Road 
they live, they even own their houses there. They are good houses actually. […] So Nubians 
wanted to defend their investments about houses and doing what. So they knew if they 
could not support the Prime Minister by that time those houses were to be taken.”65 
4.2 Inter-ethnic hostility and targeting 
“To go there to loot? No, no no!!! For the rich, they were being secured by the government. 
When you were just trying to go loot at Muthaiga [famous rich suburb not far away from 
Mathare], you were shot dead! […] Yeah. Just go, at that time, when you go and just try to 
close Thika Road for the rich, you were being shot dead” (Calvin, Mathare: 263-264, in: 
NUP; see also 265-267). 
Among slum-dwellers, consensus exists as to which groups ought to have been targeted 
during the post-election violence, namely the Kikuyu, the government, the rich, and the 
police forces. Members of the Kikuyu community living in the slums had to bear the brunt 
of inter-ethnic violence.66 The Kikuyu were targeted first on account of the fact that they 
were perceived as the ones in power. They were the ruling ethnic group, and members of 
 
 
62  Hardy, Kibera: 16-19, see also Arleen, Kibera: 2-12; Frank, Kibera: 115-121, see also Warlord, Mathare: 
34; Alice, Mathare: 13; Calvin, Mathare: 165-166; Alvin, Kibera: 10; Warlord, Mathare: 34, all in: NUP. 
63  Dennis, Kibera: 29; Clyde, Kibera: 16-17, 60-68; Alvin, Kibera: 23-24, 125-127; Alice, Mathare: 5, 32-41; 
Warlord, Mathare:  19-24; Colin, Kibera: 78-86;  Arleen, Kibera: 63, 105-112; Frank, Kibera: 10-11; Elvis, 
Mathare: 8, 82-83; Calvin: 157-159. 
64  Angela, Kibera: 84-89; see also Frank, Kibera: 12; Alvin, Kibera: 23-24, 125-127; Arleen, Kibera: 22-32, 63; 
Clyde, Kibera: 60-67; Colin, Kibera: 78-86; Similar: Alice, Mathare: 32-41; Calvin, Mathare: 157-159, all in: 
NUP. 
65  Alvin, Kibera: 10-12, in: NUP. Nonetheless, the Nubian community of Kibera was heavily hit by arson 
during the post-election violence, see Standard (7.2.2008: 29-30): “The impact of poll violence” no Author. 
66  Alice, Mathare: 5 and Calvin, Mathare: 183-184, in: NUP. 
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the other ethnic groups believed their own status to be inferior, describing themselves – 
above all the Luo – as oppressed by the Kikuyu.67 The Kikuyu were targeted next since they 
were thought to be the wealthy, a tribe of business owners, and are also said to have flaunted 
their wealth. This perception of the Kikuyu as being rich contrasts with the self-perceptions 
of members of the opposing communities as being poor.68 Lastly, the Kikuyu were targeted 
because they were perceived as being the tribe of landlords, with power over other tribes, 
the tenants. Of course this claim relates gives credence, as one can only rent out if one owns, 
and is thus perceived to be rich(er) than any tenant, or middle man.69 
The government was targeted on account of the rigged elections.70 The rich were tar-
geted because their property offered much to looters, and also on account of their general 
association with the government.71 Apart from an association with the Kibaki regime, the 
police forces became targets since the other two ‘external’ targets could only be reached 
via the police blockades that isolated the slum areas (Calvin, Mathare: 263-267, in: NUP). 
Additionally, indiscriminate use of (lethal) violence by police forces upon entering the 
narrow pathways leading to the slums infuriated the slum-dwellers.72 In the end, the few 
government symbols in the slums, such as schools and administrative buildings, were 
largely burnt or looted, as were churches. Burnings were often followed by violent clashes 
with heavily armed police forces, which, though temporarily overwhelmed in the slums, 
could not be overcome at the slum boundaries. 
Individual targeting 
“For example PNU you see: blue, blue colour. And ODM was using orange colour. So now 
we had T-Shirts or for example pictures of those people who were campaigning. So when 
you were walking around, for example […] by that time you could walk in Soweto [a village 
of Kibera] the only time you could find was just orange” (Alvin, Kibera: 17-18, in: NUP). 
Among the slum-dwellers, members of the Kikuyu were selectively targeted and suffered 
heavily from the post-election violence.73 Recognizing that members of other ethnic com-
munities were equally singled out for attack and victimization, the report will now turn to 
the targeting of members of the Kikuyu community. Perpetrator groups identified members 
of the Kikuyu as relying on several strategies: Firstly, in the densely populated slums, voting 
was by no means a secret affair. People showed their political colours during the pre-
 
 
67  Dennis, Kibera: 23-25; Edgar, Kibera: 166-172, see also Colin and Frank; Frank, Kibera: 64, Arleen, 
Kibera: 64-68, 150, all in: NUP 
68  Calvin, Mathare: 262-263; Elvis, Mathare: 22, 57-59, 73-75; Angela, Kibera: 54-60; Arleen, Kibera: 64-68; 
Frank, Kibera: 138-139; Alvin, Kibera: 71-72, 135-136, all in: NUP. 
69  Warlord, Mathare: 59-72; Alice, Mathare: 41; Elvis, Mathare: 64-76, 111-114; Edgar, Kibera: 138-149, 
155-163, see also Frank; Alvin, Kibera: 71-76, all in: NUP. 
70  Dennis, Kibera: 18-22; Edgar, Kibera: 34-39, 134-136; Colin, Kibera: 46-47; Alvin, Kibera: 64-65, 69-70, 
all in: NUP. 
71  Calvin, Mathare: 260-262; Elvis, Mathare: 22, 39-44, 91-92, 102; Dennis, Kibera, 4-6; Arleen, Kibera: 
150-152; Alvin, Kibera: 78-79, in: NUP; Nation (28.2.2002: 14-15): “Lords of Poverty have fanned hatred 
in Kenya over the years” and “Inequality behind Kenya's violence” by Serumaga, Kalundi. 
72  Calvin, Mathare: 263-264; Alvin, Kibera: 32, 63-64, 78-79, 123-124; Frank, Kibera: 4, 6, in: NUP. 
73  Calvin, Mathare: 9; Alice, Mathare, 6; Dennis, Kibera: 25, all in: NUP. 
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election campaigns and their ethnic identity could reliably be assumed (Alvin, Kibera: 17-
18, in: NUP). Secondly, local leaders with knowledge of the ethnic composition of their 
neighbourhoods were said to have supported selective targeting. Thirdly, physical appear-
ance is generally assumed to vary from tribe to tribe, yet it is not considered a reliable indi-
cator of a potential target's ethnic identity (Alvin, Kibera: 92-93, in: NUP; see also 17-18). 
Finally, the native language of potential targets (or the respective accent in English/Swahili) 
and the victim's native name were taken as the most obvious identifiers.74 Speech and name 
were checked by perpetrators as well as vigilantes, often by demanding to see an ID when 
one’s ethnic identity was in doubt. Initially, selectively targeting members of the Kikuyu 
community and/or their property was deemed an easy task, and could safely be carried out 
while minimising the potential for erroneous attacks.75 
Risk assessments, as well as risk reduction strategies,76 by slum-dwellers were heavily 
dependent on the individual's perception of his/her own personal security. During the 
post-election violence, people avoided unnecessary movement and tried to remain close 
to their homes and the neighbourhoods.77 This was especially true at night, as rumours 
and experience proved that dark nights offered additional cover for perpetrators and petty 
criminals to commit violent crimes.78 Lastly, individuals were perceived to be most vul-
nerable, which reinforced the conviction that security was only to be found among one's 
own people, ideally with large groups of armed vigilantes keeping watch (Calvin, Mathare: 
187, in: NUP). In Henry’s words: “We will attack him. When he is alone, you will be at-
tacked! HAHA, yes it's not fair but that's what happening. You just find it. I mean, you 
can’t fighting on your own” (Henry, Kibera: 77-79, in: NUP). 
4.3 Justifications for violence 
“Ok we just carried the pangas, everything we used. We just started protesting that we need 
change. […] Our rights! Our rights to be heard by the government. So that they can, they 
can value what we want” (Arleen, Kibera: 97-101, in: NUP; see also 89-96). 
Two forms of justification for the use of violence dominate the slum-dwellers' perception 
of the post-election violence. The first is related to the perceived rigging of the elections 
and to Kenyan congruency between politicians, parties and ethnic groups as a trigger of 
violence: The opposition supporters longed for change, which was politically represented 
by Raila Odinga and his ODM. When Odinga was denied his assumed right to the presi-
 
 
74  Alice, Mathare: 6; Frank, Kibera: 64-65; Alvin, Kibera: 89, in: NUP. 
75  Calvin, Mathare: 160-164; Angela, Kibera: 39-48; Alvin, Kibera: 99-104; Frank (Kibera, 12), all in: NUP; 
Nation (12.1.2008: 3): “Young people speak out on election fighting” no Author. Nation (28.1.2008: 6): 
“Camp for displaced people closed down” by Wafula, Carline. 
76  Apart from benefiting from the prevailing culture of impunity, risk reduction strategies also included 
traditional beliefs in the protective power of rites. Rumours about oath taking ceremonies conducted by 
members of the Kikuyu/Mungiki, or Kalenjin preparation ceremonies for young men circulated widely 
in Kenya during the post-election violence (and still do today). Both were interpreted as clear signs of 
pending attacks. 
77  Colin, Kibera: 77-79, in: NUP; see also Clyde, Kibera: 60-61, in: NUP. 
78  Alvin, Kibera: 87, in: NUP; see also Frank: Kibera, 12-13, in: NUP. 
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dency, this provided sufficient legitimacy for releasing the accumulated animosity of 
ODM supporters. Legitimate targets were those associated with President Kibaki.79 In 
contrast, members of Kibaki's ethnic community, the Kikuyu, justify the use of inter-
ethnic violence on the basis of their tribal allegiance; they had to protect their tribal baron 
by all means possible (Alice, Mathare: 26-31, in: NUP). The juxtaposition of both com-
munities' justification strategies sheds light on a deep-rooted, ethnically-loaded incongru-
ence that significantly heightened the likelihood of violent stand-offs. The second stream 
of justification is related to the all-consuming character of the post-election violence: 
With the slum-dwellers being cut off from their usual supplies and prices of the few avail-
able products soaring, the otherwise criminal act of looting was justified with reference to 
the need to survive. In fact, people on both ends of the ethnic spectrum were affected by 
reduced food supplies – hunger is a universal justification, crossing ethnic divides. Given 
that looting entails a degree of chaos that distracts potential security forces and/or vigi-
lante groups from patrolling an area, any act of violence necessary to obtain groceries is 
justified.80 Alvin explains: 
“They were looting because they were hungry. They were hungry. There was nowhere 
where they could buy food. They were beaten by policemen; they could not even reach the 
supermarket around there, Ngong Road. People were now just impatient. Looting shops 
[…] because that's the only option you could do. By that time there was no way you could 
buy food” (Alvin, Kibera: 37-39, in: NUP). 
4.4 The supportive social environment 
“No Raila, No Peace!”81 – “No Kibaki, No Peace!”82  
In the period of post-election violence, people who otherwise commanded some authority 
in the slums (i.e. chiefs and elders, but also, and to a lesser extent, church leaders or teach-
ers) were said to have been overpowered, like the police, and many were reported to have 
escaped during the worst episodes of violence.83 The same applies to the poorly-
performing Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK). It was solely Kenya's few top politi-
cians – also considered the tribal leaders of their people – who were accepted as authori-
 
 
79  Frank, Kibera: 103, 104, 128; Edgar, Kibera: 166-172; Dennis, Kibera: 25; Colin, Kibera: 166-172; Arleen, 
Kibera: 97-101, see also 89-96; Alice, Mathare: 3; Warlord, Mathare: 108, all in: NUP. 
80  Alvin, Kibera: 29-32, 37-39; Frank, Kibera: 6; Warlord, Mathare, 91; Calvin, Mathare: 14-20, 155; Cas-
per, Mathare: 3-5, all in: NUP. 
81  Brian, Mathare: 3-4; Calvin, Mathare: 114-122, Alvin, Kibera: 70-71, all in: NUP. 
82  John, Mathare: 2 and Jack, Mathare: 3, in: NUP. 
83  Alice, Mathare: 82-84, Calvin, Mathare: 122-128, 206-215, Frank, Kibera: 104; Alvin, Kibera: 18, 52, 112-
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stranded up-country due to the transport crisis. See Standard (15.1.2008: 8): “Schools yet to receive 
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ties by the slum-dwellers, first among them being Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga (and, 
ultimately, the UN mediator and African elder Kofi Annan).84 Voices of the top politi-
cians, transmitted via the media, were interpreted by slum-dwellers as their 'big men' 
lending authoritative social support for inter-ethnic violence. This should be clarified: 
While both of these politicians (albeit with some delay) condemned acts of ethnic vio-
lence, the same cannot be said for the use of political violence. Odinga's calls for mass 
protests against the Kibaki regime directly appealed to ODM-supporting slum-dwellers in 
his strongholds. Having pledged tribal allegiance, and having been motivated by the po-
litical call for change, the slum-dwellers took to the streets in great numbers.85 Given the 
security situation (police forces had already cordoned off the slums and the government 
had pronounced a ban on public rallies), Odinga's call was destined to ignite protest vio-
lence. The opposing slum-dwellers were aware of this and assumed, given Kenyan con-
gruency between leaders, parties and ethnicities, that if their leader Odinga condoned 
violence against the Kibaki regime, he would likewise have been supportive of inter-ethnic 
attacks in the slums, which, as side-effect, boosted his support base in the strongholds. 
The applies to the Kibaki supporters.86 
From their perspective, Kibaki did everything he could to protect his fellow Kikuyu 
against the Luo-led attackers, e.g. by sending police forces to escort the IDPs out of the 
slums. Given the reciprocal nature of patronage relations, Kibaki's public behaviour was 
interpreted as supportive of his followers own causes. What served the interests his fol-
lowers was considered to serve his own, and vice versa. This meant that inter-ethnic repri-
sal attacks by members of the Kikuyu community were deemed legitimate since they 
backed Kibaki's efforts to stay in power. Ethnic ties were perceived to link his political 
survival with the fate of the Kikuyu community as a whole, and additionally, the Kikuyu 
slum-dwellers, who had already suffered much in the first weeks of January 2008, would 
have been spared far worse if Kibaki could only stay in power. Along with hear-say and 
communication via cell phones/text messages, radio and television were the slum-
dwellers' other main sources for information.87 Reports about inter-ethnic acts of violence 
directed towards members of one’s own group had a direct impact on group passions in 
the slums. Contrary to rural radio stations, which were blamed for broadcasting hate 
speech,88 radio and TV stations in Nairobi were said to have called for peace rather than 
sending messages of incitement. These calls for non-violence were heard by the slum-
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dwellers but not acted upon. With police forces overpowered in the slums and confront-
ing violent slum-dwellers on the main roads, an almost absolute culture of impunity pre-
vailed in the slums.89 Moreover, given the harsh conduct of the security forces, the little 
remaining respect that opposition supporters among the slum-dwellers had for the secu-
rity forces diminished rapidly.90 Confronted with these realities, the police was, on the 
whole, perceived as biased, in the sense of being a tool of the government. The police 
forces therefore did not command authority in the slums and were considered a legiti-
mate target for violent confrontation.91 
4.5 Participants, perpetrators and bystanders 
“It was something that came out just once. People were saying […]: 'Come out, young men, 
all the men out. Come out, you have to protect your place. Come out! There is a group 
coming!!!” (Frank, Kibera: 152-153, in: NUP). 
Groups of young men are perceived by slum-dwellers to have been the main participants 
in post-election violence in Nairobi. Slum-dwellers differentiate these groups into good 
(protectors, vigilante, neighbourhood watch groups) and bad (perpetrators, attacker 
groups).92 The groups deemed ‘good’ are composed of members of the observer’s own 
ethnic community and were engaged primarily in protecting their immediate neighbour-
hood.93 Secondary data sources suggest that the de facto boundaries between both of these 
groups (the good protectors and the bad attackers) are somewhat more fluid than re-
ported.94 Groups of young men who claimed to be protectors could also launch offensive 
inter-ethnic attacks or engage in criminal acts (e.g. demanding protection bribes). Indeed, 
even the slum-dwellers themselves were aware of the dangers emanating from groups of 
idle young men who are said to have taken advantage of the general state of lawlessness, 
whether they termed themselves protectors or not (Alvin, Kibera: 47-50, in NUP). Acts of 
violence committed by groups are generally understood to have been committed by 
gangs, i.e. either the Taliban (Luo-dominated) or by the Mungiki (Kikuyu-dominated).95 
 
 
89  In contrast to the cities of Nakuru and Naivasha, the army was not sent to quell violence in Nairobi. 
90  Alvin, Kibera: 33-34; Elvis: 131-134; Alvin, Kibera: 105-108; Calvin, Mathare: 185-186; Edgar, Kibera: 
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154-162; Alvin, Kibera: 45-47, all in: NUP; Nation (7.2.2008: 6): “Outlawed gangs exploit poll protests to 
terrorise estates” by Nation Team. 
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Despite their perceived ineptitude (“The Mungiki? You cannot know a Mungiki!”),96 the 
Mungiki are said to be widely known for their ruthlessness and sheer brutality. Hence, the 
mere mention of the Mungiki triggered fear and alertness during the post-election vio-
lence.97 Interestingly though, and this may merely be an matter of selection bias on the part 
of informants during the present analysis, the Mungiki were reported to have turned up in 
both slums, Mathare and Kibera.98 The same goes for the Taliban, whose actual character is 
also contested and unknown, but is believed to have its stronghold in Kibera, where its 
members are said to intermingle with ordinary vigilante groups. In Alvin’s words: 
“So now you check around, Kikuyus mostly are the owners of Mungiki. […] And Talibans 
are found by Luos. Who live mostly some parts here of Nairobi. Here especially in Kibera 
we live, there is no Mungikis. Mungiki actually it is not easy to find them. If they eehhh, 
there is no way you could find them?” (Alvin, Kibera: 45-47, in: NUP). 
Assumptions about gang involvement aside, groups of young and middle-aged men are 
identified as having been most active during the post-election violence. These groups 
were perceived as having assembled throughout the slums, and becoming a member or 
creating one’s own was considered a wise act for youths. It was generally advised for eve-
ryone to stay inside and avoid contact with unknown groups of youths.99 Attacks (to loot 
or to harm) were reported to have occurred beyond ethnic zone boundaries, where mem-
bers of perpetrator groups were unknown, thus reducing the likelihood of being called to 
justice for the devastating consequences of their violent deeds.100 
5.  Conclusions 
5.1. Fire in Kenya’s urban heart of politics 
During the post-election violence, those slum-dwellers who associated themselves by he-
art or blood with the ethno-political alliance led  by opposition leader Raila Odinga and 
his Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) set out to teach Mwai Kibaki’s ethnic com-
munity, the Kikuyu, and their fellow ethnic allies a gruesome lesson. This had serious 
consequences: While almost impossible to prove given the lack of reliable ‘hard data’, the 
analysis that has been presented here reveals that the ethnic heterogeneity that had cha-
racterized the vibrant lives of millions of urban poor inhabiting Kenya’s densely popula-
ted melting-pots has been significantly reduced. The unfolding of post-election violence 
in Nairobi was primarily triggered and driven political events on the macro level (chap. 
3.1). On the micro level, however, it developed its own fatal dynamics (chap. 3.3). These 
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dynamics resulted in and accelerated the emergence of a devastating amalgam of ethnic-, 
political-, and instrumentally-motivated acts of violence (chap. 3.3) that were initiated by 
groups of young men, and tolerated – if not justified – by their fellow ethnic peers.  
This lesson was targeted at the Kikuyu. It was spearheaded by aggravated members of 
the Luo-led oppositional ethnic alliance due to the lack of alternative targets for venting 
their aggressions. The Kikuyu were shown that they were no longer welcomed in the 
strongholds of other ethnic groups and came to realize that, despite their privileged posi-
tion, they were incapable of defending themselves against the joint wrath of the long-
disregarded ethnic communities assembled under the political banner of the oppositional 
party vehicle, Odinga’s ODM. Amid violently-enforced isolation of the slums, whose in-
habitants could not reach the main stage of politics physically located in Nairobi's city 
centre, the secondary message of the Luo-led ethnic attacks was directed straight to 
Kenya's Kikuyu-dominated socio-economic elite. The bloody message conveyed through 
inter-ethnic violence thus resembles a joint outcry launched by members of the opposi-
tional ethno-political alliance. It was driven by outrage over the political betrayal of the 
opposition’s undisputed leader Raila Odinga and by the collective experience of decades 
of dishonour and degradation, which, from the perspective of the opposition supporters, 
originated not so much from identifiable members of Kenya’s Kikuyu-dominated elite, 
but from its Kikuyu ethnic community as a whole. 
Nairobi burning 
The transmission of this message was preconditioned on a willingness on the part of the 
attackers to shed blood for their cause, and proved willing to keep Nairobi burning by 
fuelling the fire. The distinct character of this message that was inscribed in post-election 
violence was rooted in the omnipresent inseparability of politics and ethnicity in the den-
sely-populated slums of Nairobi. This state of affairs was aggravated by the promise of 
citizenship inherent in the nature of democracy, seemingly within reach for the neglected 
poor only once every five years. It has been shown that under such circumstances, the 
perceived rigging of elections by Kibaki’s regime became a pivotal point for the urban 
poor. Tensions dramatically rose in Nairobi during the deadly quiet that preceded the 
eruption of violence, and the incumbent regime reacted by deploying security forces 
along slum boundaries to contain political protests; protests, which were clearly expected 
to emanate with force from ODM’s urban strongholds in the slums. This occurred owing 
not least to opposition leader Odinga publically denying the legitimacy of the election 
results and after the secretive and hasty swearing-in of President Kibaki. While the actual 
results of the elections will, in all likelihood, never to be known, what remains significant 
is that opposition- and government-supporting slum-dwellers alike interpreted the politi-
cal and local events that drove the post-election violence primarily in light of these divisi-
ve elections and their disputed outcome. This explicitly includes the shared perception of 
acts of inter-ethnic (mass) violence. 
Fuelling the fire 
The devastating material and immaterial legacy of the ethno-political fires in Nairobi 
reveal that electoral violence, driven by an amalgam of divisive democratic politics and 
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ethnicity, is wholly inseparable from instrumental uses of violence. In this analysis, five 
analytical elements have been explored, each of which, in their interaction, fuelled the bur-
ning fire of violence in Nairobi. These included, first, the tactical support for violent actions 
lent by by-standing slum-dwellers to the perpetrator groups who belonged to their respec-
tive ethnic communities (chap 4.1). A second critical situation was that, amidst the unfold-
ing chaos in the slums, diverse opportunities for singling out ethnic others arose, which 
were exploited in order to victimize individuals with impunity (chap. 4.2). Third, among the 
range of justifications for acts of (ethnic) violence that could be highlighted vis-à-vis one’s 
own impoverished peers as well as in communication with outside observers (such as the 
author of this report), one justification stands out above the others: violence directed at 
impoverished members of other ethnic communities and their property (rather than only at 
representatives of the current regime or the economically better-off) was justified on the 
grounds that ‘we were hungry’ and ‘we wanted our voices to be heard’ (chap. 4.3). Fourth, 
the authoritative social support lent to the masses of rioting slum-dwellers by their respecti-
ve top political leaders, i.e. Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki, assumed a vital role. This is not 
because these leaders openly called for violence (neither of them did), but rather on account 
of the fact that their demonstrative absence and/or lack of strong-hearted personal engage-
ment in bridging the ethno-political divide in a publicly visible manner was interpreted by 
their impoverished peers as a clear signal to carry on and support their leader’s political 
struggles for power by violently standing their ground in the slums (chap.4.4). 
Lastly, the unfolding of chaos in the slums provided incentives for establishing ethni-
cally homogeneous vigilante groups to protect one’s own families, property and, territori-
ally speaking, neighbourhood. Due to the generally ambivalent nature of (armed) groups 
of young men in the slums – heightened during the period of violence – this paved the 
way for the ‘hijacking’ of the post-electoral period by existing criminal gangs, shadowy 
movements and local strongmen with selfish economic interests (chap. 4.5). This hijack-
ing of the post-election period was successful in the sense that it provided the idle and im-
poverished youths in the slums who were vulnerable to dynamics of violence in Nairobi and 
tempted by the material gains of violence with the conviction of carrying out their deeds for 
the greater good. In doing what the perpetrators of inter-ethnic violence did when an occa-
sion presented itself during the post-election violence, they inevitably were fulfilling their 
own ethnic group's ‘just’ cause. 
Withstanding the fire 
The ethno-political character of the slum-dwellers' message to the incumbent PNU go-
vernment and its intrinsic entanglement with the nature of democratic politics presented 
here directs attention to yet another message. Established knowledge of ethnic riots tells 
us that periods of intense violence are characterized by the absolute absence of coopera-
tion between members of one ethnic group and another. Yet what emerges from this ana-
lysis is that even during the worst periods of ethnic violence, inter-group cooperation was 
never wholly absent. This is quite clearly true for roughly half of Nairobi's citizens, who, 
as the spatial concentration of violence in the slums reveals, did not participate in any acts 
of inter-ethnic violence. In other words: in those areas where poverty was not dire, violen-
ce did not erupt. But even within the slums, a sense of cooperation prevailed across ethnic 
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lines, albeit on a very limited scale. While it has been demonstrated that remorse about 
the goals of post-election violence was largely absent among oppositional slum-dwellers, it 
has also been shown that the slum-dwellers, as a whole, did not support the brutality of the 
means for achieving them. On the contrary, opposition- and government-supporting slum-
dwellers alike both condemned them strongly. While inter-group hostility clearly replaced 
inter-group cooperation during the post-election violence, what seems to have prevailed 
among slum-dwellers was a sense of joint fate, a common destiny shared by an inter-ethnic 
community of Kenya's neglected poor.  
Alternatively, one must bear in mind that the research for this report was conducted 
about one-and-a-half years after the post-election violence came to an end. Since then, in-
ter-group amity seems to have regained some lost ground in the slums of Nairobi. Be that as 
it may, the following can be reasoned with considerable certainty: Considering the adamant 
justifications of Nairobi's poor, the circular nature of ethnic attacks, the heavy losses the 
slum-dwellers suffered on both sides of the ethnic divide, and the uneasy regard for the 
fragile peace in the slums, the bloody ‘lesson’ was, without a doubt, widely taken to heart 
among them. The question remains of whether or not the lesson was also internalized by 
the thereafter established inter-ethnic coalition government, which incorporates the big 
men of the antagonized ethno-political alliances under the leadership of Mwai Kibaki 
(PNU), as President, and Raila Odinga (ODM), as Prime Minster. The ongoing public devi-
ance of tribal barons such as Higher Education Minister William Ruto (an ethnic Kalenjin) 
who has charges against him at the ICC and a current suspension, the recent performance 
of the coalition government, and the rather sluggish implementation of its reform agenda 
together suggest that Kenya's political leaders do not necessarily perceive of themselves as 
having a stake in their multi-ethnic nation's shared future. In this spirit, the joint message 
emanating from Nairobi’s impoverished melting pots during and after post-election vio-
lence resembles a democratic outcry from Kenya’s multitude of neglected poor. These im-
poverished people – as ethnically diverse as they are politically and socio-economically 
marginalized – demand that their voices be heard by wider Kenyan society.  
5.2 Preventing future flare-ups 
Kenya’s poor want to be taken seriously by their elected political leaders. During the post-
election chaos, politicians were violently reminded that they need to truly commit them-
selves to fighting for socio-economic empowerment and democratic inclusion of their 
urban (and rural) citizens. This joint message assumed bloody forms because alternative 
channels were barred and non-violent forms of protests were believed to go unheard and 
unacknowledged. Despite the decisive material and immaterial legacies created by the 
post-election violence, potentials for peaceful inter-ethnic cooperation still exist among 
the marginalized have-nots at the grassroots level. 
Inter-ethnic alliance-forging 
Maintenance of peace in Kenya ultimately requires that those political leaders who intend 
to run in 2012 go beyond the narrow margins of political tribalism. They need to form an 
inter-ethnic alliance that includes the main antagonized groups, i.e. the Kikuyu and the 
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Luo, while at the same time abstaining from alienating their poor and marginalized ethnic 
peers in the slums. They must also be sure not to alienate Kenyans who belong to (formerly) 
allied ethnic communities such as the Kalenjin, whose rural impoverished members were 
heavily involved in acts of violence in areas such as the infamous Rift Valley Province. In the 
run-up to the approaching elections, public politics conducted at Kenya’s top levels should 
therefore focus on the creation of publicly-visible symbols of inter-group cooperation. Gi-
ven that Kenya’s impoverished citizens are socio-economically and politically marginalized 
but not ignorant, such inter-ethnic elite cooperation should be conducted in the most ho-
nest way possible. Articulating such a demand is not wishful thinking: Kenya’s current poli-
ticians, including Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga, have already proven that they are capable 
and willing to turn the tides of their multi-ethnic country’s political situation for the better. 
One can think back to the formation of the National Rainbow Coalition, which, supported 
by a vibrant civil society movement, resulted in the cooperative ousting of long-term dicta-
tor, President Daniel arap Moi in 2002. A further example was the peacefully-held constitu-
tional referendum held as recently as 2010, during which Kibaki and Odinga publicly wor-
ked together in the victorious ‘Yes’-campaign. This stands in contrast to the ‘No’-campaign, 
which was led by the currently-suspended Higher Education Minister Ruto. Admittedly, 
recommendations urging pre-election inter-party and inter-ethnic memorandums of un-
derstanding among Kenya’s political leaders do not accord with traditional liberal unders-
tandings of democracy. However, as history tells us, this may be the only way to avoid futu-
re flare-ups of post-electoral violence. 
Pre-emptive actions 
In 40 of the 46 African countries that host multiparty elections, legal frameworks are in 
place that provide for the possibility of bans on political parties with particularistic agendas. 
Nearly all of them mention ethnicity as a possible reason for imposing a ban. Only the legal 
systems of Botswana, the Comoros, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Kenya do not 
grant this possibility (Becher 2008: 91). Acknowledging that legal acts are often not worth 
the paper they are written on, it may nonetheless be time to consider similar options for the 
Kenyan political setting. To be clear, what is needed is not pro forma action such as the in-
troduction of quotas regulating the composition of a party’s political leadership. Instead, 
what is needed are policies and regulations that aim at de facto limits on the influence of 
parties or party coalitions, the ones appealing exclusively to members of certain ethnic 
communities while alienating others. Beyond that, Kenya’s current electoral system – ad-
vantageous to political leaders with strong ethnic standings – should be reconsidered. The 
same goes for the practice of publishing daily opinion polls before the elections and for the 
system of incorporating provincial results into the public tallying of the votes. The latter is 
important, firstly, because Kenya’s ethnic divisions are mirrored in the demographics of the 
country’s many provinces and on the level of rural and urban constituencies, and, secondly, 
because questions of territoriality are not only politically contested (e.g. under the header of 
Majimboism) but, above all, violently fought out in rural as well as urban areas by Kenya’s 
marginalized poor. Another recommendation would be to remind Kenya’s political leaders 
that their primary task should to prepare the groundwork for mid-term political inclusion 
and the socio-economic improvement of the lives of their fellow countrymen – be they 
urban or rural, rich or poor, male or female, Kikuyu or Luo, or associated with any other of 
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Kenya’s many ethnic communities. The least the reformist should do is uphold and intensi-
fy the currently ongoing fight against the culture of impunity and (fiscal) opaqueness, still 
characterising many layers of Kenya’s political, legal, and economic systems. Admittedly, 
pushing for socio-economic redistribution, political accountability and legal certainty may – 
as important as they are – constitute long-term goals, which now leads us to some short-
term recommendations. 
The micro level 
In case Kenya is once again pushed to the brink, either before, during or after the next 
elections, repressive police tactics such as violently cordoning off the slums and the exces-
sive use of lethal force should be avoided by all means. This report has demonstrated that 
the side-effects of trying to create hermetically-sealed areas within Nairobi to protect the 
lives and property of its general population (and especially Kenya’s rich, whose estates are 
located only a few kilometres away from the slums) cannot be overrated. Excessive use of 
lethal violence by police forces accompanying such efforts provided rioters with ample 
justification to continue engaging in the above-mentioned amalgam of politically-, ethni-
cally- and instrumentally-motivated acts of violence. If the use of repressive force should, 
however, prove necessary, established knowledge about ethnic riots tell us to that shows 
of massive force on the side of the security forces generally deter rioters. Consequently, 
with the police having proven that they are unable to comprehensively deal with large-
scale eruptions of ethno-political violence, the politically realistic conclusion would be to 
deploy military units as soon as possible. In Horowitz’s (Horowitz 2001: 359, also 361ff) 
words “if the army is dependable, the riot will end as a riot. If it is not, it may become 
something much worse.” In Naivasha and Nakuru, the Kenyan army has, in the past, been 
deployed during post-election violence, proving comparatively successful at quelling ef-
forts. If the army must again be deployed in densely-populated urban areas during or 
after the elections in 2012, this must proceed rapidly and greatest possible care must to be 
taken so that neither the army nor any other branch of the security forces engages in the 
excessive use of repressive violence. 
Crucial for the suppression of large-scale acts of riot violence is an indiscriminate show 
of force in the early stages of violent inter-group confrontations. Naturally, such a show of 
force must be supplemented by concrete actions against clearly-identifiable perpetrators. 
Any excessive use of regime-directed violence against the masses of political demonstra-
tors would be highly counter-productive and would only fuel the spiral of violence; this 
applies particularly to the (rather likely) case that some protestors will engage in instru-
mental acts of violence, such as looting. Acting Senior Superintendent of Police, Joseph 
Musyoka Nthenge, provides for a great example of how security forces ought to behave in 
the midst of violence: Nthenge became famous for having demonstrated responsible be-
haviour towards rioting mobs while in charge of a unit of the paramilitary Kenyan anti-
riot force, the General Service Unit (GSU), patrolling the streets of Nairobi in December 
of 2007. As UN Acting Director General Ms. Inga Klevby put it during an official cere-
mony organised in his honour in 2008: 
“today the United Nations family in Kenya recognizes Supt. Nthenge for his contribution to 
peace through dialogue. He is indeed worthy of the title – ‘Kenyan hero’ [...] within a 48 
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hour period, Nthenge employed dialogue and negotiations four times to extinguish possible 
violent flare-ups. In addition to being seen on TV persuading a mob away from their de-
structive behavior, he convinced two other mobs in the city as well as dissuading a group of 
Members of Parliament (MPs) to call off a march to challenge the banning of public gather-
ing inside the city’s largest park (Uhuru Park) by the police” (UNIC 2008). 
This report has sought to make clear that utmost care needs be taken to ensure that security 
forces – whichever branch they may be – not only act appropriately and restrained, but also 
that they safeguard the continuous supply of necessary provisions (such as mobile phone 
credits) and, most importantly, affordable foodstuffs to Kenya’s impoverished urban areas. 
Secure supply corridors must be kept open under any circumstances so that the majority of 
slum-dwellers who run small informal businesses or pursue jobs in other parts of the cities 
may continue to work, thus being able to sustain themselves and their families. 
Societal and international pressure 
Recommending that Kenya’s current political elite refrain from the threat or use of exces-
sive force and requesting that they instead react to the (joint) demands of their impover-
ished electorates in constructive ways – beyond merely uttering pre-election promises 
(and gifts) to fellow members of their own ethnic community – is indeed a lot to ask of 
them. In order to pressure Kenya’s leaders to behave responsibly during times of fierce 
electoral competition, the joint support of the country’s civil society and its critical media 
is required. This, however, will likely not be enough. Political pressure needs to be exerted 
by the international community as well; first and foremost, by members of the numerous 
local and regional diplomats as well as various powerful international donor organisations 
and multinational enterprises that have their regional headquarters in Nairobi’s posh 
suburbs. While continuing to support Kenya’s vibrant civil society and local initiatives 
seeking political and socio-economic empowerment, these organisations and individuals 
can, at best, mutually step up political efforts to restrain Kenya’s political radicals and 
increase support for the moderate voices among them. The ‘activist approach’ to diplom-
acy taken by Michael Ranneberger – former U.S. ambassador to Kenya, and his colleague 
Walter Lindner, former German ambassador – provides for a good example of how such 
a cooperative and critical engagement could be conducted at the diplomatic level.101 In the 
end, however, and despite what happens to the (in)famous ‘Ocambo six’ at Den Haag, 
Kenya’s fate is not in the hands of the international community. The joint fate of its 
ethnically diverse citizenry of 41 million is in the hands of the country’s political elite, and 
it depends on the very words and deeds they choose to convey to the urban poor and their 
rural counterparts. As an anonymous informant put it in the aftermath of the post-
election violence in reference to his fellow slum-dwellers: “when they join their hearts, 
you cannot stop them.” 
 
 
101  See Wadhams (2011). 
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